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The possibility of judgment
aggregation on agendas with subjunctive implications
Franz Dietrich1
April 2005, revised May 2007
to appear in Journal of Economic Theory
Abstract. The new eld of judgment aggregation aims to nd collective judgments
on logically interconnected propositions. Recent impossibility results establish lim-
itations on the possibility to vote independently on the propositions. I show that,
fortunately, the impossibility results do not apply to a wide class of realistic agendas
once propositions like if a then b are adequately modelled, namely as subjunct-
ive implications rather than material implications. For these agendas, consistent and
complete collective judgments can be reached through appropriate quota rules (which
decide propositions using acceptance thresholds). I characterise the class of these
quota rules. I also prove an abstract result that characterises consistent aggregation
for arbitrary agendas in a general logic.
Key words: judgment aggregation, subjunctive implication, material implication,
characterisation of possibility agendas
JEL Classication Numbers: D70, D71, D79
1 Introduction
In judgment aggregation, the objects of the group decision are not as usual (mutually
exclusive) alternatives, but propositions representing interrelated (yes/no) questions
the group faces. To ensure that these interrelations are well-dened, propositions are
statements in a formal logic. As a simple example, suppose the three-member board
of a central bank disagrees on which of the following propositions hold.
a : GDP growth will pick up.
b : Ination will pick up.
a! b : If GDP growth will pick up then ination will pick up.
Reaching collective beliefs is non-trivial. In Table 1, each board member holds
consistent (yes/no) beliefs but the propositionwise majority beliefs are inconsistent.
To achieve consistent collective judgments, the group cannot use majority voting.
What procedure should the group use instead? A wide-spread view is that, in this
1This paper was presented at the Risk, Uncertainty and Decision seminar (MSE, Paris, April
2005), the Aggregation of Opinions workshop (Yale Law School, September 2006), and the 8th Au-
gustus de Morgan workshop (Kings College London, November 2006). Benjamin Polaks extensive
comments and suggestions have beneted the paper on substantive and presentational levels. I am
also grateful for helpful comments by two referees and by Christian List and Philippe Mongin.
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a a! b b
1/3 of the board Yes Yes Yes
1/3 of the board No Yes No
1/3 of the board Yes No No
Collective under majority rule Yes Yes No
Collective under premise-based rule Yes Yes Yes
Collective under the (below-dened) quota rule No No No
Table 1: A simple judgment aggregation problem and three aggregation rules
as in most other judgment aggregation problems, we must give up aggregating pro-
positionwise2, for instance in favour of a premise-base rule (as discussed below). I
show that this conclusion is often an artifact of an inappropriate way to model im-
plications like a ! b. In many judgment aggregation problems, a more appropriate
subjunctive interpretation of implications changes the logical relations between pro-
positions in such a way that we can aggregate on a propositionwise basis without
creating collective inconsistencies. Indeed, we can use quota rules: here, separate an-
onymous votes are taken on each proposition using (proposition-specic) acceptance
thresholds. Suppose for instance that the following thresholds are used: b is accepted
if and only if a majority accepts b, and a p 2 fa; a! bg is accepted if and only if at
least 3/4 of people accept p. Then, in the situation of Table 1, a, a! b and b are all
rejected, i.e. the outcome is f:a;:(a! b);:bg.
The problem is that this outcome, although intuitively perfectly consistent, is
declared inconsistent in classical logic, because classical logic denes :(a ! b) as
equivalent to a ^ :b (a and not-b), by interpreting !as a material rather than
a subjunctive implication. Is this equivalence plausible in our example? Intuitively,
a ^ :b does indeed entail :(a ! b), but :(a ! b) does not entail a ^ :b because
:(a! b) does not intend to say anything about whether a and b are actually true or
false: rather it intends to say that b would be false in the hypothetical (hence possibly
counterfactual) case of as truth. Indeed, a person who believes that it is false that
a pick up in GDP growth leads to a pick up in ination may or may not believe
that GDP growth or ination will actually pick up; what he believes is rather that
ination will not pick up in the hypothetical case(s) that GDP growth will pick up.
In real-life judgment aggregation problems, implication statements usually have a
subjunctive meaning. It is important not to misrepresent this meaning using material
implications and classical logic, because this creates unnatural logical connections and
articial impossibilities of aggregation. The above quota rule, for instance, guarantees
collective consistency (not just for the prole in Table 1) if the implication a ! b
is subjunctive, but not if it is material. More generally, I establish the existence of
quota rules with consistent outcomes for a large class of realistic agendas: the so-called
implication agendas, which contain (bi-)implications and atomic propositions. This
possibility is created by interpreting (bi-)implications subjunctively; it disappears if
we instead use classical logic, i.e. interpret (bi-)implications materially. At rst sight,
this positive nding seems in conict with the recent surge of impossibility results
2That is, aggregating by voting independently on the propositions: the collective judgment on any
proposition p depends only on how the individuals judge p, not on how they judge other propositions.
This property is usually called independence.
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on propositionwise aggregation (see below). In fact, these results presuppose logical
interconnections between propositions that are stronger than (or di¤erent to) those
which I obtain here under the subjunctive interpretation of (bi-)implications. In
various results, I derive the (necessary and su¢ cient) conditions that the acceptance
thresholds of quota rules must satisfy in order to guarantee consistent outcomes.
These results are applications of an abstract characterisation result, Theorem 3, which
is valid for arbitrary agendas in a general logic. It also generalises the intersection
property result by Nehring and Puppe [18, 19] (but not that by Dietrich and List
[6]).
Although I show that collective consistency is often achievable by aggregating
propositionwise (using quota rules), I do not wish to generally advocate proposition-
wise aggregation. In particular, one may reject propositionwise aggregation rules by
arguing that they neglect relevant information: in order to decide on b it is arguably
not just relevant how people judge b but also why they do so, i.e. how they judge
bs premisesa and a ! b. This naturally leads to the popular premise-based rule:
here, only a and a! b the premisesare decided through (majority) votes, while
b the conclusionis accepted if and only if a and a! b have been accepted; so
that, in the situation of Table 1, a and a! b, and hence b, are accepted.
Despite the mentioned objection, propositionwise aggregation rules are superior
from a manipulation angle: non-propositionwise aggregation rules can be manipulated
by agenda setters (Dietrich [2]) and by voters (Dietrich and List [5]).3
In general, the judgment aggregation problem deciding which propositions to
accept based on which ones the individuals accept and its formal results are open
to di¤erent interpretations of accepting and di¤erent sorts of propositions. This
papers examples and discussion focus on the case that acceptingmeans believ-
ing,4 and mostly on the case that the propositions have a descriptive content (like
GDP growth will pick up), although Section 4 touches on normative propositions
(like peace is better than war).5
In the literature, judgment aggregation is discussed on a less formal basis in
law (e.g. Kornhauser and Sager [12], Chapman [1]) and political philosophy (e.g.
Pettit [22]), and is formalised in List and Pettit [15] who use classical propositional
logic. Also the related belief merging literature in articial intelligence uses classical
propositional logic to represent propositions (e.g. Konieczny and Pino-Perez [11] and
Pigozzi [23]). A series of results establish, for di¤erent agendas, the impossibility of
aggregating on a propositionwise basis in accordance with collective consistency and
di¤erent other conditions (e.g. List and Pettit [15], Pauly and van Hees [21], Dietrich
[2, 4], Gärdenfors [10], Nehring and Puppe [20], van Hees [26], Dietrich and List [7],
Dokow and Holzman [9] and Mongin [17]). Further impossibilities (with minimal
3Consider for instance premise-based voting in Table 1. The agenda setter may reverse the
outcome on b by replacing the premises a and a ! b by other premises a0 and a0 ! b. Voter 2
or 3 can reverse the outcome on b by pretending to reject both premises a and a! b.
4Judgment aggregation is the aggregation of belief sets if accepting means believing, the
aggregation of desire sets if acceptingmeans desiring, the aggregation of moral judgment sets if
acceptingmeans considering as morally good, etc.
5By considering beliefs on possibly normative propositions, judgment aggregation uses a broader
beliefnotion than is common in economics, where beliefs usually apply to descriptive facts only.
For instance, standard preference aggregation problems can be modelled as judgment aggregation
problems by interpreting preferences as beliefs of normative propositions like x is better than y
(see Dietrich and List [7]; also List and Pettit [16]).
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agenda conditions) follow from Nehring and Puppes [18, 19] results on strategy-
proof social choice. To achieve possibility, propositionwise aggregation is given up
in favour of distance-based aggregation by Pigozzi [23] (drawing on Konieczny and
Pino-Perez [11]), of sequential aggregation by List [14] and Dietrich and List [6], and
of aggregating relevant information by Dietrich [4].
Section 7 uses Dietrichs [3] judgment aggregation model in general logics, and
the other sections use for the rst time possible-worlds semantics.
2 Denitions
We consider a group or persons N = f1; 2; : : : ; ng (n  2), who need collective
judgments on a set of propositions expressed in formal logic.
The language. Following Dietrichs [3] general logics model, a language is given by
a non-empty set L of sentences (called propositions) closed under negation, i.e. p 2 L
implies :p 2 L. (Interesting languages of course have also other connectives than
negation :). Logical interconnections are captured either by an entailment relation 
(telling for which A  L and p 2 L we have A  p) or, equivalently, by a consistency
notion (telling which sets A  L are consistent).6 The two notions are interdenable:
a set A  L is inconsistent if and only A  p and A  :p for some p 2 L; and an
entailment A  p holds if and only if A[ f:pg is inconsistent.7 The precise nature of
logical interconnections is addressed later. A proposition p 2 L is a contradiction if
fpg is inconsistent, and a tautology if f:pg is inconsistent.
All following sections except Section 7 consider a particular language: L is the set
of propositions constructible using : (not), ^ (and) and! (if-then) from a set
A 6= ; of non-decomposable symbols, called atomic propositions (and representing
simple statements like ination will pick up). So L is the smallest set such that (i)
A  L and (ii) p; q 2 L implies :p 2 L, (p ^ q) 2 L and (p ! q) 2 L. The critical
question, treated in the next section, is how (not) to dene the logical interconnections
on L: while some entailments like a; b  a ^ b and a; a! b  b are not controversial,
others are. Notationally, I drop brackets when there is no ambiguity, e.g. c! (a^ b)
stands for (c ! (a ^ b)). Further, p _ q (p or q) stands for :(:p ^ :q), and
p $ q (p if and only if q) stands for (p ! q) ^ (q ! p). For any conjunction
p = a1 ^ ::: ^ ak of one or more atomic propositions a1; :::; ak (called the conjuncts of
p), let C(p) := fa1; :::; akg (e.g. C(a) = fag and C(a ^ b) = C(b ^ a) = fa; bg).
In judgment aggregation, the term connection rulecommonly refers to implic-
ational statements like if GDP growth continues and interest rates stay below X
then ination will rise. I now formalise this terminology. If each of p and q is a
conjunction of one or more atomic propositions,
6For the two approaches, see Dietrich [3]. Logical interconnections can be interpreted either
semantically or syntactically (in the latter case, the symbol `is more common than ). In the
(classical or non-classical) logics considered in Sections 3-6, I dene interconnections semantically
(but there are equivalent syntactic denitions). Dropping brackets, I often write p1; :::; pk  p for
fp1; :::; pkg  p.
7The latter equivalence supposes that the logic is not paraconsistent. All logics considered in this
paper are of this kind.
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 p ! q is a uni-directional connection rule, called non-degenerate if C(q)nC
(p) 6= ;, i.e. if p! q is not a tautology (under the classical or the non-classical
entailment relation discussed later);
 p $ q is a bi-directional connection rule, called non-degenerate if C(q)nC(p)
6= ; and C(p)nC(q) 6= ;, i.e. if neither p! q nor q ! p is a tautology.
A uni- or bi-directional connection rule is simply called a connection rule.
The agenda. The agenda is the set of propositions on which decisions are needed.
Formally, it is a non-empty set X  L of the form X = fp;:p : p 2 X+g for
some set X+ containing no negated proposition :q. In the introductory example,
X+ = fa; b; a ! bg. Notationally, double-negations cancel each other out: if p 2 X
is a negated proposition :q then hereafter when I write :pI mean q rather than
::q. (This ensures that :p 2 X.)
An agendaX (in the language L just dened) is an implication agenda if X+
consists of non-degenerate connection rules and the atomic propositions occurring in
them; it is called simple if all its connection rules are uni-directional ones p ! q in
which p and q are atomic propositions.
Many standard examples of judgment aggregation problems can be modelled with
implication agendas. The atomic propositions represent (controversial) issues, and
connection rules represent (controversial) links between issues. Any accepted connec-
tion rule establishes a constraint on how to decide the issues.
b
a
(1) X + = {a, b,
a ® b}
b
a
(2) X + = {a, b,
a « b}
(3) X + = {a, b, c,
c « (a Ù b)}
c
ba
(4) X + = {a, b, c, a ® b
c « a, a ® (b Ù c)}
b c
a
a b
d c
b
c
a
(5) X + = {a, b, c, d, e,
a ® b, b ® c, d ® e}
(6) X + = {a, b, c, d, a ® b,
b ® c, c ® d, d ® a}
b c
a
(7) X + = {a, b, c, a ® b, b ® a,
b ® c, c ® b, c ® a, a ® c}
e
d
Figure 1: Seven implication agendas, represented as networks.
Implication agendas can always be represented graphically as networks over its
atomic propositions.8 Figure 1 shows seven implication agendas, of which (1) and
8Nodes contain atomic propositions. Arrows represent connection rules: bi-directional arrows
indicate bi-implications, and bifurcations indicate conjunctions of more than one atomic proposition.
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(5)-(7) are simple. Agenda (1) represents our central bank example. An environ-
mental expert commission might face the agenda (2), where a is global warming will
continueand b is the ozone hole exceeds size X. The judges of a legal court face, in
the decision problem from which judgment aggregation originated, an agenda of type
(3), where a is the defendant has broken the contract, b is the contract is legally
valid, c is the defendant is liable, and c $ (a ^ b) is a claim on what constitutes
(necessary and su¢ cient) conditions of liability.9 A company board trying to predict
the price policy of three rival rms A-C might face the agenda (3) or (4) or (7), where
a is Firm A will raise prices, b is Firm B will raise prices, and c is Firm C will
raise prices. The three agendas di¤er in the type of connections between a; b; c
deemed possible.
In Section 4, I discuss two types of decision problems captured by implication
agendas: reaching judgments on facts and their causal relations, and reaching judg-
ments on hypotheses and their justicational/evidential relations.
But not all realistic judgment aggregation problems are formalisable by implic-
ation agendas. Some judgment aggregation problems involve a generalised kind of
implication agenda, obtained by generalising the denition of connection rules so as
to include (bi-)implications between propositions p and q other than conjunctions of
atomic propositions.10 More radical departures from implication agendas include: (i)
the agenda given by X+ = fa; b; a ^ bg, which contains no connection rule but the
Boolean expression a^ b; (ii) the agenda representing a preference aggregation prob-
lem, which contains propositions of the form xRy from a predicate logic (see Section
7); (iii) agendas where X+ contains only atomic propositions, between which certain
connection rules are imposed exogenously (rather than subjected to a decision).
Judgment sets. A judgment set (held by a person or the group) is a subset A  X;
p 2 A stands for the person/group accepts proposition p. A judgment set A can
be more or less rational. Ideally, it should be both complete, i.e. contain at least one
member of each pair p;:p 2 X, and (logically) consistent. A is weakly consistent if A
does not contain a pair p;:p 2 X (i.e., intuitively, ifA is not obviously inconsistent).
For agenda (1) in Figure 1, fa; a ! b;:bg is complete, weakly consistent, but not
consistent because A entails b (in fact, fa; a! bg entails b) and A entails :b (in fact,
contains :b). So to say, weak consistencymeans not to contain a contradiction
p;:p, and consistency means not to entail one.
Aggregation rules. A prole is an n-tuple (A1; : : : ; An) of (individual) judg-
ment sets Ai  X. A (judgment) aggregation rule is a function F that maps
each prole (A1; : : : ; An) from a given domain of proles to a (group) judgment set
F (A1; : : : ; An) = A  X. The domain of F is universal if it consists of all proles of
complete and consistent judgment sets. F is complete/consistent/weakly consistent if
F generates a complete/consistent/weakly consistent judgment set for each prole in
9A doctrinal paradox arises if there is a majority for a, a majority for b, a unanimity for c$ (a^b),
but a majorty for :c.
10 If, for instance, p and q were allowed to be dis junctions of atomic propositions then a! (b _ c)
would count as a connection rule, so that X+ = fa; b; c; (a _ b) ! cg would dene an implication
agenda of the so-generalised kind. Generalised implication agendas may well be relevant as groups
may need to make up their mind on generalised types of connection rules. The possibility of consistent
aggregation by quota rules may disappear for such agendas. So our subjunctive reading of (bi-
)implications (see Section 3) is not a general recipe for possibility in judgment aggregation.
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its domain. On the universal domain, majority rule (given by F (A1; :::; An) = fp 2
X : more persons i have p 2 Ai than p =2 Aig) is weakly consistent, and a dictatorial
rule (given by F (A1; :::; An) = Aj for a xed j) is even consistent. We will focus on
quota rules thus dened. To each family (mp)p2X+ of numbers in f1; :::; ng, the quota
rule with thresholds (mp)p2X+ is the aggregation rule with universal domain given by
F(mp)p2X+ (A1; :::; An) = fp 2 X : at least mp persons i have p 2 Aig,
where m:p := n mp + 1 for all p 2 X+ to ensure exactly one member of each pair
p;:p 2 X is accepted, i.e. that quota rules are complete and weakly consistent.
So each family of thresholds (mp)p2X+ in f1; :::; ng generates a quota rule. As
one easily checks, an aggregation rule is a quota rule if and only if it has universal
domain and is complete, weakly consistent, independent, anonymous, monotonic, and
responsive.11 The important property missing here is consistency. We will investigate
if and how the thresholds can be chosen so as to achieve consistency. The properties of
independence and monotonicity are equivalent to strategy-proofness if each individual
i holds epistemic preferences, i.e. would like the group to hold beliefs close to Ai, the
set of propositions i considers true.12
3 A non-classical logic
How should we dene the logical interconnections within the language L specied in
Section 2? Although classical logic gets some entailments right (like a; a! b  b), its
treatment of connection rules is inappropriate, or so I will argue.
Requirements on the representation of connection rules. To reect the in-
tended meaning of connection rules such as a! b; c$ a; a! (b^c), the logic should
respect the following conditions.
(a) The acceptance of a connection rule r establishes exactly the intended logical
constraints on atomic propositions, i.e. r is consistent with the rightsets of
atomic and negated atomic propositions. For instance, a ! b is inconsistent
with fa;:bg but consistent with each of fa; bg; f:a; bg; f:a;:bg.
11 Independence : for all p 2 X and all admissible proles (A1; :::; An); (A1; :::; An), if fi :
p 2 Aig = fi : p 2 Ai ) then p 2 F (A1; :::; An) , p 2 F (A1; :::; An). Anonymity :
F (A1; :::; An) = F (A(1); :::; A(n)) for all admissible proles (A1; :::; An), (A(1); :::; A(n)), where
 : N 7! N is any permutation. Monotonicity : for all individuals i and admissible proles
(A1; :::; An); (A1; :::; A

i ; :::; An) di¤ering only in is judgment set, if F (A1; :::; An) = A

i then
F (A1; :::; A

i ; :::; An) = A

i . Responsiveness : for all p 2 X (such that neither p nor :p is a tautology)
there are admissible proles (A1; :::; An), (A1; :::; A

n) with p 2 F (A1; :::; An) and p =2 F (A1; :::; An).
Clearly, quota rules satisfy all seven axioms. Conversely, independence and anonymity imply that the
group judgment on any given p 2 X depends only on the number np := jfi : p 2 Aigj. This depend-
ence is positive by monotonicity, hence described by an acceptance threshold mp 2 f0; 1; :::; n + 1g.
If p and :p are not tautologies, mp is by responsiveness not 0 and not n+1, i.e. mp 2 f1; :::; ng; and
m:p = n mp + 1 by completeness and weak consistency. If p or :p is a tautology, we may assume
w.l.o.g. that, again, mp 2 f1; :::; ng and m:p = n mp + 1.
12That is, i weakly prefers the group to hold judgment set A over judgment set B if for all p 2 X
on which Ai agrees with B, Ai also agrees with A. This condition only partly xes is preferences,
but it for instance implies that i most prefers is own judgment set Ai. See Dietrich and List [5].
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(b) The negation of a (non-degenerate) connection rule r does not constrain atomic
propositions, i.e. :r is consistent with each (consistent) set of atomic and
negated atomic propositions. For instance, :(a! b) is consistent with each of
fa; bg, fa;:bg; f:a; bg; f:a;:bg.
To illustrate (b), consider again the central bank example, where a is GDP
growth will pick upand b is ination will pick up. Consider a board member who
believes that :(a ! b), i.e. that rising GDP does not imply rising ination. This
belief is intuitively perfectly consistent with any beliefs on a and b, i.e. on whether
GDP will grow and whether ination will rise.
The failure of the material implication. Material (bi-)implications (used in
classical logic) satisfy (a) but not (b). Consider a! b. Interpreted materially, a! b
is equivalent to :a _ b (not-a or b), and :(a! b) to a ^ :b (a and not-b); so:
 (a) holds because a! b is inconsistent with fa;:bg (as desired) and consistent
with each of fa; bg; f:a; bg; f:a;:bg (as desired);
 (b) is violated because :(a! b), far from imposing no constraints, is inconsist-
ent with all sets containing :a or containing b.
It is well-known that the material interpretation misrepresents the intended mean-
ing of most conditional statements in common language. The (in common language
clearly false) statement if the sun stops shining then we burn is true materially
because the sun does not stop shining. The material interpretation clashes with intu-
ition because, in common language, if a then bis not a statement about the actual
world, but about whether b holds in hypothetical world(s) where a holds, e.g. worlds
where the sun stops shining. If a then bthus means if a were true ceteris paribus,
then b would be true, not a is false or b is true.
A conditional logic. A subjunctive reading of !, where the truth value of
a! b depends on bs truth value in possibly non-actual worlds, has been formalised
using possible-worlds semantics, and more specically using conditional logic which
originated from Stalnaker [25] and D. Lewis [13] and is now well-established in non-
classical logic. I use a standard version of conditional logic, sometimes denoted C+
(other versions could also be used). For further reference, e.g. Priest [24].
For comparison, recall that in classical logic (not in C+) A  L entails p 2 L
if and only if every classical interpretation that makes all q 2 A true makes p true,
where a classical interpretation is simply a (truth) function v : L ! fT; Fg that
assigns to each proposition a truth value such that, for all p; q 2 L,
 v(:p) = T if and only if v(p) = F ,
 v(p ^ q) = T if and only if v(p) = T and v(q) = T ,
 v(p! q) = T if and only if v(p) = F or v(q) = T (material implication).
This leads to counter-intuitive entailments like :a  a ! b and b  a ! b, the
so-called paradoxes of material implication. In response, the notion of an interpret-
ationmust be redened. A C+-interpretation consists of
 a non-empty set W of (possible) worlds w;
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 for every proposition p 2 L a function fp : W ! P(W ) (fp(w) contains the
worlds to which if p were truerefers, i.e. the worlds similarto w and with
true p);
 for every world w 2 W a (truth) function vw : L ! fT; Fg (that tells what
propositions hold in w).
set of worlds W
w’ (world similar to
w, but with true p)
function fp
(“if p were true”)
w (actual world)
Figure 2: Referring to a non-actual world, in a C+-interpretation
But not any such triple (W; (fp); (vw))  (W; (fp)p2L; (vw)w2W ) may reasonably
count as an interpretation: indeed, the meaning of the functions fp and vw suggests
requiring additional properties. Specically, such a triple (W; (fp); (vw)) is dened as
a (C+-)interpretation if, for all worlds w 2W and all propositions p; q 2 L,
 vw(:p) = T if and only if vw(p) = F (like in classical logic),
 vw(p ^ q) = T if and only if vw(p) = T and vw(q) = T (like in classical logic),
 vw(p! q) = T if and only if vw0(q) = T for all worlds w0 2 fp(w) (subjunctive
implication),
 if w0 2 fp(w) then vw0(p) = T (i.e. p holds in the worlds to which if p were
truerefers),
 if vw(p) = T then w 2 fp(w) (i.e. if p already holds in w then if p were true
refers to w).
The truth condition for p! q (third bullet point) captures the intuitive meaning
of implications. If the sun stops shining then we burnis false in our world: we do
not burn in worlds similar to ours but without the sun shining.
By denition, A  L (C+-)entails p 2 L (A  p) if, for all interpretations
(W; (fp); (vw)) and all worlds w 2 W , if all q 2 A hold in w then p holds in w (i.e. p
holds wheneverall q 2 A hold). For instance, a; b; (a ^ b)! c  c; but :a 2 a! b
and b 2 a! b (so C+ does not su¤er the paradoxes of material implication). Recall
that A  L is consistent if and only if there is no p 2 L with A  p and A  :p. So
 A is (C+-)consistent if and only if there is an interpretation (W; (fp); (vw)) and a
world w 2W in which all q 2 A hold (i.e. all q 2 A canhold simultaneously).
So fa;:ag is inconsistent: if a holds in a word w, :a is false in w. And fa;:(a!
b); bg is consistent (but classically inconsistent): let a and b both hold in w and let
fa(w) contain a world w0 in which b is false.13
13This is an example of why C+ meets our requirement (b) on the treatment of connection rules.
To verify (b) in general, apply Lemma 8 to sets A consisting of negated non-degenerate connection
rules and of atomic or negated atomic propositions (and note that (20) does not hold since A\R = ;).
9
4 Simple implication agendas
Given the logic C+, which quota rules are consistent? I rst give an answer for simple
implication agendas.
Theorem 1 A quota rule F(mp)p2X+ for a simple implication agenda X is consistent
if and only if
mb  ma +ma!b   n for all a! b 2 X. (1)
So consistent quota rules do exist: putting mp = n for all p 2 X+ validates (1).
But this extreme quota rule is far from the only consistent quota rule; for instance,
(1) holds if all atomic propositions a 2 X get the same threshold ma (so all issues
are treated symmetrically) and all connection rules a ! b 2 X get the unanimity
threshold ma!b = n (so links between issues are very hard to accept).
Some consequences of (1) can be expressed in terms of the network structure of
the (simple) implication agenda X (see Figure 1 for examples of network structures).
The nodes are the atomic propositions in X, and if a ! b 2 X then a is a parent
of b and b a child of a. The notions of ancestor and descendant follow by transitive
closure. By (1), ma  mb if a is a parent, or more generally an ancestor, of b. In
particular, ma = mb if a and b are in a cycle, i.e. are ancestors of each other. In
short, thresholds of atomic propositions weakly decrease along (descending) paths,
and are constant within cycles. Cycles severely restrict the thresholds not only of its
member propositions but also of the connection rules a ! b linking them: we must
have ma!b = n, as is seen by setting ma = mb in (1).
The picture changes radically if we misrepresent the decision problem by using
classical logic: then there exists at most one and typically no consistent quota rule
F(mp)p2X+ , where consistentnow means classically consistent and the (universal)
domain of F(mp)p2X+ now consists of the proles of complete and classically consist-
ent judgment sets.14 More precisely, the classical counterpart of Theorem 1 is the
following result.
Theorem 1* Dening logical interconnections using classical logic, a quota rule
F(mp)p2X+ for a simple implication agenda X is consistent if and only if
ma = n and ma!b = mb = 1 for all a! b 2 X. (2)
So there is no classically consistent quota rule ifX contains a chaina! b; b! c;
and there is a single (unnatural) one otherwise.
Each of the two theorems can be proven in two steps: step 1 identies possible
types/sources of inconsistency, and step 2 shows that (1) (respectively, (2)) is neces-
sary and su¢ cient to prevent these types of inconsistency.
More precisely, Theorem 1 follows from the following two lemmas (steps) by noting
that any collective judgment set A  X generated by a quota rule satises:
A contains exactly one member of each pair p;:p 2 X. (3)
14Within a simple implication agenda X, the classical logical interconnections are stronger than
the C+ ones: all classically consistent sets A  X are C+-consistent but not vice versa (see Lemmas
1, 2). So a consistent quoto rules (universal) domain and co-domain shrink by moving to classical
logic.
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Lemma 1 For a simple implication agenda X, a set A  X satisfying (3) is con-
sistent if and only if it contains no triple a; a! b;:b 2 X.
Lemma 2 For a simple implication agenda X, a quota rule F(mp)p2X+ never accepts
any triple a; a! b;:b 2 X if and only if (1) holds.15
Analogously, Theorem 1* follows from the following two lemmas (steps).
Lemma 1* For a simple implication agenda X, a set A  X satisfying (3) is
classically consistent if and only if it contains no triple a; a ! b;:b 2 X or pair
b;:(a! b) 2 X or pair :a;:(a! b) 2 X.
Lemma 2* For a simple implication agenda with the logical interconnections of clas-
sical logic, a quota rule F(mp)p2X+ never accepts any triple a; a ! b;:b 2 X or pair
b;:(a! b) 2 X or pair :a;:(a! b) 2 X if and only if (2) holds.
Lemmas 1 and 1* highlight the di¤erence between non-classical and classical lo-
gic: the latter creates two additional types of inconsistency (in simple implication
agendas). These additional inconsistencies are articial; e.g. b is intuitively con-
sistent with :(a ! b). By Lemma 2, (1) is necessary and su¢ cient to exclude all
non-classical inconsistencies a; a ! b;:b 2 X. But (1) does nothing to prevent the
articial classical inconsistencies.16 To prevent also these, (1) must be strengthened
to (2) by Lemma 2*.
I rst prove Lemmas 1 and 1*, in reverse order to start simple.
Proof Lemma 1*. LetX andA be as specied. Clearly, ifA contains a triple a; a!
b;:b or pair b;:(a! b) or pair :a;:(a! b), then A is classically inconsistent. Now
suppose A does not contain such a triple or pair. To show As classical consistency,
I dene a classical interpretation v : L ! fT; Fg that a¢ rms all p 2 A. Dene v by
the condition that the only true atomic propositions are those in A. Then all atomic
or negated atomic members of A are true. Further, every a ! b 2 A is true: as A
does not contain the triple a; a ! b;:b, A either contains b, in which case b is true,
hence a ! b is true; or A contains :a, in which case a is false, hence a ! b is true.
Finally, every :(a ! b) 2 A is true: as A contains neither the pair b;:(a ! b) nor
the pair :a;:(a! b), A contains neither b nor :a, so that b is false and a true, and
hence a! b is false, i.e. :(a! b) is true.
Proof of Lemma 1. Let X and A  X be as specied. If A  X contains a
triple a; a! b;:b, A is of course (C+-)inconsistent. Now assume A contains no triple
a; a ! b;:b. To show that A is consistent (though perhaps classically inconsistent),
I specify a C+-interpretation (W; (fp); (vw)) with a world w 2 W in which all p 2 A
hold. Let W contain:
(a) a world w, in which an atomic proposition a holds if and only if a 2 A;
(b) for every atomic proposition a, a world wa (6= w) such that
15Neverof course means for no prole in the (universal) domain of F(mp)p2X+.
16For instance, the pair b;:(a ! b) 2 X is collectively accepted if mb < ma!b (which (1) allows)
and if mb persons accept the pair b; a! b and all others accept the pair :b;:(a! b).
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 fa( w) = fwag if a =2 A and fa( w) = f w;wag if a 2 A (so if a were truerefers
to wa, and as required by the notion of a C+-interpretation also to the actual
world w if a holds there, i.e. if a 2 A);
 in wa exactly those atomic propositions b are false for which :(a! b) 2 A.
We have to convince ourselves that all p 2 A hold in w. All atomic or negated
atomic p 2 A hold in w by (a). Also any negated implication :(a ! b) 2 A holds
in w: by (b), if a were truerefers to wa, in which b is false; whence in w a ! b is
false, i.e. :(a! b) true. Finally, suppose a! b 2 A. I have to show that b holds in
all worlds w 2 fa( w). There are two cases.
Case 1 : a 2 A. Then fa( w) = f w;wag by (b). First, b holds in w: otherwise b =2 A
(by (a)), so that A would contain the triple a; a ! b;:b, a contradiction. Second, b
holds in wa: otherwise :(a! b) 2 A (by (b)), contradicting a! b 2 A.
Case 2 : a =2 A. Then fa( w) = fwag; and b holds in wa, as just mentioned. 
I now show Lemmas 2 and 2*, completing the proof of Theorems 1 and 1*.
Proof of Lemma 2. Let F(mp)p2X+ be a quota rule for a simple implication agenda
X. Take a given triple a; a! b;:b 2 X. I consider all proles for which a and a! b
are collectively accepted, and I show that b is collectively accepted (i.e. :b rejected)
for all such proles if and only if mb  ma +ma!b   n.
Note rst that in all such proles at least ma people accept a and at least ma!b
people accept a ! b; hence the number of people accepting both these propositions
(hence also b) is at least ma +ma!b   n (in fact, at least maxfma +ma!b   n; 0g).
Thus, if mb  ma+ma!b n, b is in all such proles accepted by at least mb people,
hence collectively accepted.
For the converse, note that among such proles there is one such that exactly
maxfma +ma!b   n; 0g people accept both a and a! b (hence b) and such that no
one else accepts b. If mb > ma +ma!b   n, then in this prole less than mb people
accept b, so that b is collectively rejected. 
Proof of Lemma 2*. Let F(mp)p2X+ be a quota rule for a simple implication agenda
X, with the classical logical interconnections. Lemma 2 (and its proof) also holds
under classical logic; so F(mp)p2X+ never accepts any triple a; a ! b;:b 2 X if and
only if (1) holds. Further, a given pair b;:(a! b) 2 X is never accepted if and only
if mb  ma!b: necessity of mb  ma!b follows from footnote 16, and su¢ ciency holds
because, as b classically entails a! b, a! b is (in any prole) accepted by at least as
many people as b. By an analogous argument, a given pair :a;:(a! b) 2 X is never
accepted if and only if ma!b  n ma+1 (= m:a). In summary, we thus have three
inequalities for every a ! b 2 X: that in (1), mb  ma!b, and ma!b  n ma + 1.
Together these inequalities are equivalent to the condition in (2), as is easily checked.

Constructing consistent quota rules. I now discuss how to choose thresholds
(mp)p2X+ that satisfy (1), for a simple implication agenda X. The notions of a
child/parent and a descendant/ancestor are dened above. A path is a sequence
(a1; a2; :::; ak) in X (k  2) in which each aj is a parent of aj+1 (j < k). X is acyclic
if it has no cycle, i.e. no path (a1; :::; ak) with a1 = ak. The depth of X is dX := supfk
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: there is a path in X of length kg, and the level of an atomic proposition a 2 X is
la := supfk : there is a path in X of length k ending with ag, interpreted as 1 if no
path ends with a. So a 2 X has level 1 if it has no parents, level 2 if it has parents
all of which have level 1, etc. Figure 3 shows an acyclic simple implication agenda
with three levels.
ba c d e flevel 1:
h i jlevel 2:
k l mlevel 3:
g
Figure 3: An acyclic simple implication agenda X of depth dX = 3.
How free are we in choosing the thresholds (mp)p2X+? Clearly, by (1) the
thresholds of atomic propositions must weakly decrease along any path. If X is
acyclic and nite (hence of nite depth dX), (mp)p2X+ can be chosen recursively in
the following dX steps.
Step l (= 1; 2; :::; dX): for all b 2 X of level l, choose a threshold mb 2 f1; :::; ng and
thresholds ma!b 2 f1; :::; ng for the parents a of b, such that
mb  ma +ma!b   n for all parents a of b. (4)
But this procedure may involve choosing many thresholds: in Figure 3, those of
13 atomic propositions and 13 implications! To reduce complexity, one might use
 the same threshold m = ma!b for all connection rules a ! b 2 X, where m
reects how easily the group imposes constraints between issues,
 the same threshold ml for all propositions in X with the same level l (2
f1; :::; dXg), where ml reects how easily the group accepts level l propositions.
I write such a quota rule as Fm;m1;:::;mdK . Here, only dX + 1 parameters must be
chosen, e.g., in Figure 3, 3 + 1 = 4 parameters instead of 26. Applied to quota rules
of this type, Theorem 1 yields the following characterisation, by a proof left to the
reader.
Corollary 1 For a nite acyclic simple implication agenda X, a quota rule Fm;m1;:::;mdK
is consistent if and only if
ml  ml 1 +m  n for all levels l 2 f2; :::; dXg. (5)
Consistent quota rules of type Fm;m1;:::;mdK can be constructed as follows.
Step 0: choose m 2 f1; :::; ng such that (i) m  n  (n  1)=(dX   1).
Step l (= 1; 2; :::; dX): choose ml 2 f1; :::; ng such that (ii) ml  1+(dX   l)(n m)
and (iii) ml  ml 1 +m  n if l > 1.
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The conditions (i)-(iii) follow from Corollary 1: (iii) is obvious, and (i) and (ii)
make the choices in future steps possible.17 For a group of size n = 10 and the agenda
of Figure 3, a consistent quota rule Fm;m1;m2;m3 might be chosen as follows.
Step 0: m = 8 (note that 8  n  (n  1)=(dX   1) = 10  9=2 = 5:5).
Step 1: m1 = 8 (note that 8  1 + (dX   1)(n m) = 1 + 2 2 = 5).
Step 2: m2 = 6 (note that 6  1+(dX 2)(n m) = 1+2 = 3 and 6  m1+m n =
8 + 8  10 = 6).
Step 3: m3 = 4 (note that 4  1 + (dX   3)(n  m) = 1 and 4  m2 +m   n =
6 + 8  10 = 4).
Causal and justicational interpretation. I now o¤er two interpretations of
connection rules, and hence of the kind of decision problems captured by implication
agendas. For simplicity, I restrict myself to a simple implication agendas X.
First, suppose implications a ! b 2 X have a causal status: a ! b means that
fact a causes fact b. So X might contain if the ozone hole has size X then global
warming will continueand if global warming will continue then species Y will die
out. Then X captures a decision problem of forming beliefs about facts and their
causal links. A path (a1; :::; ak) in X is a causal chain (assuming the causal links
a1 ! a2; :::; ak 1 ! ak hold), and the level of a proposition indicates how causally
fundamental it is. By an earlier remark, Theorem 1 implies that the acceptance
threshold must weakly decrease along any causal chain.
Second, suppose the implications a ! b 2 X have a justicational (or evidential
or indicative) status: a! b means that a indicates b (a can indicate b without causing
b: a wet street indicates rain without causing it). So X captures a decision problem
of forming beliefs about claims/statements/hypotheses and their justicational links.
Some claims may have a normative content, like a multi-cultural society is desir-
able or option x is better than option y. For instance, an environmental panel
might decide on a : the ozone hole has size larger than X, b : tax T on kerosine
should be introduced, and the justicational link a ! b. A path (a1; :::; ak) is an
argumentativechain (assuming the links a1 ! a2; :::; ak 1 ! ak hold), and the level
of a proposition reects how argumentatively fundamental it is. Often, high level
propositions are more concrete and might state that certain collective acts should
be taken (a road should be built, a rm downsized, a law amended, etc.), whereas
their ancestors describe potential reasons or arguments, either of a descriptive kind
(tra¢ c will increase, demand will fall, etc.) or of a normative kind (multi-culturalism
is desirable, etc.). Of course, one may reject a reason a 2 X, or reject as status as
reason for b 2 X (i.e. reject a! b). Again, reasons need at least as high acceptance
thresholds as their (argumentative) descendents, e.g. 34n versus
1
2n.
5 Other special implication agendas
The di¤erence between using non-classical and using classical logic is now further
illustrated by considering two other types of implication agendas X, namely
17For instance, without (i) there would be no choices of m1; :::;mdX satisfying (5).
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 semi-simple ones: here all connection rules in X are implications p! b in which
b is atomic (such as (a ^ c)! b but not a! (b ^ c));
 bi-simple ones: here all connection rules in X are bi-implications a$ b in which
a and b are atomic.
For each of these agenda types, we again perform two steps (analogous to the
steps performed for simple implication agendas):
(step 1) we identify possible types/sources of inconsistency in the agenda;
(step 2) we exclude each one by an inequality on thresholds and if possible we
simplify the system of inequalities.
This gives a consistency condition for quota rules F(mp)p2X+ , in analogy to The-
orem 1. Again, using instead classical logic leads in step 1 to additional (articial)
types of inconsistency; so that, in analogy to Theorem 1*, at most one (degenerate)
quota rule F(mp)p2X+ is classically consistent (if X is semi-simple), or even no one (if
X is bi-simple). Table 2 summarises the results for each agenda type
Agenda
type
A set A  X satisfying (3) is consistent
i¤ it has no subset of type(s)...
F(mp)p2X+ is
consistent i¤ ...
simple
fa; a! b;:bg
in CL also: fb;:(a! b)g; f:a;:(a! b)g
(1)
in CL: (2)
semi-simple
C(p) [ fp! b;:bg
in CL also: fb;:(p! b)g; f:a;:(p! b)g (a 2 C(p))
(7)
in CL: (8)
bi-simple
fa;:b; a$ bg; f:a; b; a$ bg; fa$ b;:(b$ agg
in CL also: fa; b;:(a$ b)g; f:a;:b;:(a$ b)g
(9)
in CL: never
Table 2: Three types of implication agendas X, their types of inconsistencies, and
their consistent quota rules; in non-classical logic and in classical logic (CL)
In Table 2, the results for simple X were shown in the last section. Regarding
semi- or bi-simple X, we have to adapt Lemmas 1 and 2 (or 1* and 2* for classical
logic). Let me briey indicate how this works. First a general remark. The types of
inconsistency in step 1 can be (and are in Table 2) identied with certain inconsistent
sets Y  X (which are minimal inconsistent, in fact irreducible; see Section 7); and
the inequality needed in step 2 to exclude Y s acceptance can always be written asX
p2Y
(n mp) < n, or equivalently
X
p2Y
mp > n(jY j   1) (6)
(see Lemma 5 in Section 7). Intuitively, (6) requires the propositions in Y to have
su¢ ciently high acceptance thresholds to prevent joint acceptance of all p 2 Y .
First let X be semi-simple. In step 1 we have to consider not only inconsistent
sets of type fa; a ! b;:bg  X (as for simple X) but also ones like fa; c; (a ^ c) !
b;:bg  X. By adapting Lemma 1 to semi-simple agendas, the inconsistent sets
in step 1 turn out to be precisely the sets C(p) [ fp ! b;:bg  X. In the proof
of Lemma 1, the C+-interpretation (W; (fp); (vw)) should be adapted by letting W
contain:
(a) a world w, in which an atomic proposition a holds i¤ a 2 A (as before)
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(b) for any conjunction p of atomic propositions a world wp (6= w) such that
 fp( w) = fwpg if C(p) 6 A and fp( w) = f w;wpg if C(p)  A (so if p were true
refers to world wp, and also to the actual world w if p holds there);
 in wp exactly those atomic propositions b are false for which :(p! b) 2 A.
The rest of Lemma 1  showing that all p 2 A hold in w  is easily adapted.
Using (6), it then follows that a quota rule F(mp)p2X+ is consistent if and only ifX
a2C(p)[fp!b;:bg(n ma) < n for all p! b 2 X; or equivalentlyX
a2C(p)
(n ma) +mb  mp!b for all p! b 2 X. (7)
Note that this characterisation indeed reduces to Theorem 1 if X is simple.
By contrast, classical logic leads in step 1 to new inconsistent sets of type fb;:(p!
b)g  X and f:a;:(p! b)g with a 2 C(p), as is seen by adapting Lemma 1* (without
even having to redene the classical interpretation v : L ! fT; Fg). As a result, a
quota rule F(mp)p2X+ is classically consistent if and only if
ma = n and mp!b = mb = 1 for all p! b 2 X and all a 2 C(p). (8)
Again, this characterisation reduces to Theorem 1* if X is simple.
Now let X be bi-simple. In step 1, the sets of type fa;:b; a$ bg or f:a; b; a$ bg
or fa $ b;:(b $ agg capture all types of (non-classical) inconsistency. This can be
shown by again adapting Lemma 1 and its proof; when dening the C+-interpretation
(W; (fp); (vw)), we simply have to replace the second bullet point of (b) by:
 in the world wa (to which if a were truerefers), exactly those atomic propos-
itions b are false for which :(a$ b) 2 A or :(b$ a) 2 A.
By adapting Lemma 2 and its proof (or by using (6) and that m:q = n mq + 1
for all q 2 X), a quota rule F(mp)p2X+ is seen to be consistent if and only if, for all
a $ b 2 X, mb  ma +ma$b   n and ma  mb +ma$b   n and if also b $ a 2 X
ma$b  mb$a ; which is equivalent to:
ma$b = n and ma = mb for all a$ b 2 X. (9)
So all bi-implications need the unanimity threshold, and two atomic propositions
(issues) need the same threshold if they are linked by a bi-implication in X or,
more generally, by a path of bi-implications in X.
In contrast, classical logic leads (by adapting Lemma 1*) to the additional types of
inconsistency fa; b;:(a$ b)g; f:a;:b;:(a$ b)g (which are articial since negating
a$ b shouldnt constrain as and bs truth values: it shouldnt establish the constraint
a$ :b). This leads (using (6)) to the additional inequalities
ma +mb +m:(a$b) > 2n and m:a +m:b +m:(a$b) > 2n for all a$ b 2 X.
In this, we have by (9)m:(a$b) = 1, so thatma+mb  2n andm:a+m:b  2n, hence
ma = mb = m:a = m:b = n, a contradiction. So there is no classically consistent
quota rule.
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Transforming implication agendas into semi-simple ones. Semi-simple im-
plication agendas are of special interest. While they exclude from the agenda many
connection rules  all uni-directional ones with non-atomic consequent and all bi-
directional ones  each connection rule of the excluded type can be rewritten, in
logically equivalent terms, as a conjunction of connection rules of the non-excluded
type p! b with atomic b: indeed, each uni-directional connection rule p! q is equi-
valent to the conjunction ^b2C(q)nC(p)(p! b), and each bi-directional connection rule
p$ q is equivalent to the conjunction  ^b2C(q)nC(p)(p! b) ^  ^b2C(p)nC(q)(q ! b).
So every implication agenda X can be transformed into a semi-simple one ~X by re-
placing every non-allowedconnection rule r 2 X+ by all the allowedones p! b
of which r is a conjunction (up to logical equivalence). For instance, the implication
agenda X given by X+ = fa; b; c; c $ (a ^ b)g, which models the judgesdecision
problem in a law suit (see Section 2), can be transformed into the semi-simple im-
plication agenda ~X given by ~X+ = fa; b; c; c ! a; c ! b; (a ^ b) ! cg; under ~X,
the judges decide not en bloc on c $ (a ^ b), but separately on whether liability of
the defendant implies breach of the contract, whether liability implies validity of the
contract, and whether breach of a valid contract implies liability.
Should we conclude from this that all collective decision problems describable by
an implication agenda X, like the mentioned one of judges in a law suit, can be
remodelled using the corresponding semi-simple implication agenda ~X? And that
we could therefore restrict ourselves to the semi-simple case? Not quite, because the
change of agenda alters the decision problem. More precisely, it renes (i.e. augments)
the decision problem: indeed, from any (complete and consistent) judgment set for ~X
we can always derive a unique one forX, but not vice versa. In the example just given,
the judgments on the newconnection rules c! a; c! b; (a ^ b)! c 2 ~X together
imply a judgment on the old one c $ (a ^ b) 2 X, but not vice versa because if
c $ (a ^ b) is negated we do not know which one(s) of c ! a; c ! b; (a ^ b) ! c to
negate (we only know that at least one of them must be negated). In summary, it is
true that the decision problem described by X can be settled by moving to the semi-
simple agenda ~X, but one thereby settles more and one uses richer in- and output
information in the aggregation.
6 General implication agendas
Many implication agendas are of neither of the kinds analysed so far, because they
contain connection rules like a ! (b ^ c) or (a ^ b) $ (a ^ c). Which quota rules
are consistent for general implication agendas (in the non-classical logic C+)? In
principle, the above two-step procedure applies again. But, for an agenda class as
rich as this one, a so far neglected question becomes pressing: what is it that makes
an inconsistent set Y  X a type of inconsistency (in step 1)? Why for instance
did we count sets fa; a! b;:bg  X but not sets fa; a! b; b! c;:cg  X as types
of inconsistency for simple implication agendas X? Surely, the set Y of all types of
inconsistency Y  X must, to enable step 1, be chosen such that
every inconsistent set A  X satisfying ( 3) has a subset in Y. (10)
But usually many choices of Y satisfy (10). Intuitively, it is useful to choose Y small
and simple. An always possible but often unduly large choice of Y is to include
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in Y all minimal inconsistent sets Y  X.18 For simple implication agendas X, we
chose Y = ffa; a ! b;:bg : a ! b 2 Xg, although we could have also included
minimal inconsistent sets of type fa; a! b; b! c;:cg  X. We were able to exclude
such sets (and still satisfy (10)) because such sets are reducible in the following sense.
For a set A  X satisfying (3), if A  fa; a ! b; b ! c;:cg then, as A contains b or
:b, either A  fb; b! c;:cg or A  fa; a! b;:bg, whence A has a subset in Y.
In Section 7, a general method to choose Y is developed, based on a formalisation
of what it means to reducean inconsistent set to a simpler one; Y then contains
irreducible sets. Applied to implication agendas, the method yields two kinds of
irreducible sets, i.e. two types of inconsistency (as shown in the appendix19):
(Ir+) sets representing an inconsistency between a non-negated connection rule and
atomic or negated atomic propositions, like fa! (b^c); a;:bg or fa$ b;:a; bg;
(Ir ) sets representing an inconsistency between a negated connection rule and non-
negated connection rules, like f:(a ! (b ^ c)); a ! b; a ! cg or f:(a !
(b ^ c ^ d)); a! (b ^ c); a$ dg.
In step 2, these irreducible sets yield a system of inequalities whose successive
simplication gives the characterisation of Theorem 2 below. This characterisation
involves, for every p! q 2 X, a particular set Xp!q. This set is dened in two steps.
First, we form the set
Xp := fs 2 L : p! s 2 X or p$ s 2 X or s$ p 2 Xg
of all propositions reachable from p via (bi-)implications in X. From Xp we then
form the set
Xp!q := fS  Xp : S is minimal subject to C(q)nC(p)  [s2SC(s)g
of all sets S  Xp that have, and are minimal subject to, this property: each atomic
proposition in q (but not in p) is in some s 2 S. So the sets S 2 Xp!q
minimally coverC(q)nC(p).
Evaluating Xp and Xp!q is purely mechanical. As a rst example, suppose
X+ = fa; b; c; a! b; a! c; a! (b ^ c)g. (11)
Here all three implications have antecedent a, where Xa = fb; c; b ^ cg. From Xa we
then derive Xa!b; Xa!c and Xa!(b^c). For instance, Xa!b contains fbg  Xa and
fb^ cg  Xa as both minimally coverb, but contains neither fcg  Xa (which fails
to cover b), nor fb; cg  Xa (which covers b non-minimally as we can remove
c), nor any other set S  Xa. Further, Xa!(b^c) does not contain fc; b ^ cg  Xa:
although this set covers b ^ c (as all atomic propositions in b ^ c are insome
s 2 fc; b^ cg), it does so non-minimally (as c can be removed); but Xa!(b^c) contains
fb; cg and fb ^ cg (which coverb ^ c minimally). In summary,
Xa!b = ffbg; fb ^ cgg; Xa!c = ffcg; fb ^ cgg; Xa!(b^c) = ffb; cg; fb ^ cgg. (12)
18Y is minimal inconsistent if Y is inconsistent but its proper subsets are consistent.
19 In fact, each type has two subtypes, one for uni- and one for bi-directional connection rules.
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As a second example, suppose
X+ = fa; b; c; a! b; a! (b ^ c); c$ ag. (13)
The two implications, a ! b and a ! (b ^ c), both have antecedent a, where Xa =
fb; c; b ^ cg. From Xa we then derive that:
Xa!b = ffbg; fb ^ cgg, Xa!(b^c) = ffb; cg; fb ^ cgg. (14)
Sets Xp!q appear in Theorem 2 because they are needed to describe inconsist-
encies of type (Ir ). Let me give an intuition for why the sets Xp!q relate to
inconsistencies of type (Ir ) (details are in the appendix). For the agenda (11),
Y = f:(a ! (b ^ c)); a ! b; a ! cg is an inconsistency of type (Ir ). Y is
inconsistent precisely because the conjuncts of a ^ b are covered by the set of
consequents of a ! b; a ! c 2 Y , i.e. by fb; cg; in fact, they are so minimally:
fb; cg 2 Xa!(b^c). Another agenda X might have the inconsistency of type (Ir )
f:(a! (b^ c^ d)); a! (b^ c); a$ dg. This set is inconsistent precisely because the
conjuncts of b ^ c ^ d are coveredby the set of consequents fb ^ c; dg; they are so
minimally: fb ^ c; dg 2 Xa!(b^c^d).
I now state the characterisation result (formally proven in the appendix). As
usual, AB denotes the symmetric di¤erence (AnB) [ (BnA) of sets A and B.
Theorem 2 A quota rule F(mp)p2X+ for an implication agenda X is consistent if and
only if the thresholds satisfy the following:
(a) for every p! q 2 X,X
a2C(p)
(n ma) + max
b2C(q)nC(p)
mb  mp!q  n  max
S2Xp!q
X
s2S:p!s2X
(n mp!s);
(b) for every p $ q 2 X, (i) mp$q = n, (ii) ma = n for all a 2 C(p) \ C(q), and
(iii) ma is the same for all a 2 C(p)C(q) and equals n if jC(p)C(q)j  3.
Theorem 2 characterises consistent quota rules by complicated (in)equalities. A
rough interpretation is:
 inconsistencies of type (Ir+) are prevented by the LHS inequalities of (a) and
by (b);
 given the LHS inequalities of (a) and (b), inconsistencies of type (Ir ) are
prevented by the RHS inequalities in (a).
More detailed clues to understand the conditions (a) and (b) are given at the
section end, drawing on the insights gained above on the simple, semi-simple and
bi-simple case.
In practice, the system (a)&(b) often simplies. Part (a) or part (b) drops out if
X contains no uni- or no bi-directional connection rules, respectively. If X is simple,
semi-simple or bi-simple, (a)&(b) reduces to the conditions derived earlier (namely
(1), (7) or (9), respectively).20 Further, the system (a)&(b) may simplify once the
20 If X is simple, this is so because (b) drops out and because in (a) the RHS inequality holds
trivially (by Xp!q = ffqgg) and the LHS inequality reduces to n mp +mq  mp!q.
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concrete sets Xp!q, p ! q 2 X, are inserted, possibly resulting in a simpler set of
conditions that o¤ers an intuition for the size and structure of the space of possible
threshold assignments. The next example demonstrate this.
Example. Consider the agenda in (13). Which thresholds (mp)p2X+ guarantee
consistency? By Theorem 2, three conditions must hold: one for a ! b (part (a)),
one for a! (b^ c) (part (a)), and one for c$ a (part (b)). The three conditions are:8><>:
n ma +mb  ma!b  n maxS2Xa!b
X
s2S:a!s2X(n ma!s)
n ma +maxfmb;mcg  ma!(b^c)  n maxS2Xa!(b^c)
X
s2S:a!s2X(n ma!s)
mc$a = n and ma = mc.
(15)
In this system, the upper bounds of ma!b and ma!(b^c)  I call them Ba!b and
Ba!(b^c), respectively should be computed by inserting the sets Xa!b and Xa!(b^c)
as given in (14). Then Ba!b and Ba!(b^c) greatly simplify (and turn out to be equal)
because each summation 
X
s2S:a!s2Xruns over just one term:
Ba!b = n max
8<: X
s2fbg:a!s2X
(n ma!s);
X
s2fb^cg:a!s2X
(n ma!s)
9=;
= n maxfn ma!b; n ma!(b^c)g = minfma!b;ma!(b^c)g,
Ba!(b^c) = n max
8<: X
s2fb;cg:a!s2X
(n ma!s);
X
s2fb^cg:a!s2X
(n ma!s)
9=;
= n maxfn ma!b; n ma!(b^c)g = minfma!b;ma!(b^c)g.
So, in the system (15), the RHS inequalities on the rst two lines are jointly equivalent
to ma!b = ma!(b^c). By ma = mc, the LHS inequality on the second line implies
n ma +maxfmb;mag  ma!(b^c), and so maxfn ma +mb; ng  ma!(b^c); which
(by ma!(b^c)  n) implies that ma!(b^c) = n, and that n   ma + mb  n, i.e.
mb  ma. Using all this, the system (15) is equivalent to:
mb  ma = mc and ma!b = ma!(b^c) = mc$a = n.
This is an example of how the presence of a bi -directional connection rule r in X can
drastically narrow down the possibility space, especially relative to thresholds of r,
of atomic propositions inr, and of connection rules logically related to r.
I now record two corollaries of Theorem 2. First, a possibility result follows.21
Corollary 2 For an implication agenda X, there exists
(i) a consistent quota rule F(mp)p2X+ (hence a consistent, complete, independent,
anonymous, monotonic and responsive aggregation rule with universal domain);
21See Section 2 and footnote 11 for the conditions listed in part (i). By a di¤erent proof, part (i)
holds more generally for any agenda X for which each p 2 X+ is atomic or a connection rule (where,
unlike for implication agendas, the atomic propositions in X+ may di¤er from those contained in the
connection rules in X+).
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(ii) a single consistent quota rule F(mp)p2X+ with identical thresholds mp; p 2 X+,
namely the quota rule with a unanimity threshold mp = n for all p 2 X+.
Proof. As (ii) implies (i), I only show (ii). Let X be an implication agenda and
F(mp)p2X+ a quota rule with identical thresholds mp = m (2 f1; :::; ng). If m = n
then (a)&(b) hold, implying consistency. Conversely, assume consistency. So (a)&(b)
hold. X contains a p ! q or a p $ q (otherwise X would be empty, hence not an
agenda). In the second case, m = n by (b). In the rst case, the LHS inequality in
(a) implies
X
a2C(p)(n m) +m  m, whence again m = n. 
So there is possibility  but how large is it? That is, how much freedom does
Theorem 2 leave us in the choice of thresholds? As I now show, paths and cycles in X
impose rather severe restrictions. Extending earlier denitions from simple to general
implication agendas, consider the network over the atomic propositions in X, where
an atomic proposition a 2 X a parent of another one b 2 X if there is a p ! q 2 X
or a p$ q 2 X or a q $ p 2 X such that a 2 C(p) and b 2 C(q)nC(p). Parenthood
yields the notion of an ancestor by transitive closure. A path is a sequence (a1; :::; ak)
(k  2) where aj is a parent of aj+1 for all j < k; it is a cycle if a1 = ak.
Corollary 3 Let F(mp)p2X+ be a consistent quota rule for an implication agenda X.
(i) If a 2 X is an ancestor of b 2 X then ma  mb.
(ii) If a; b 2 X occur in a cycle (i.e. are ancestors of each other) then ma = mb
and mp!q = n for all p! q 2 X with a 2 C(p) and b 2 C(q)nC(p).
Proof. Let X and F(mp)p2X+ be as specied.
(i) Let a 2 X be a parent of b 2 X (obviously it su¢ ces to consider this case).
Then a 2 C(p) and b 2 C(q)nC(p), where p! q 2 X or p$ q 2 X or q $ p 2 X. In
the last two cases, (b) implies ma  mb. In the rst case, the LHS inequality in (a)
implies (n ma) +mb  mp!q, so mb  mp!q   n+ma  ma.
(ii) Let a; b be as specied. By (i) ma  mb and mb  ma, hence ma = mb. Now
let p! q be as specied. By the LHS inequality in (a), (n ma)+mb  mp!q, hence
(by ma = mb) mp!q = n. 
An intuition for Theorem 2. Our earlier insights about simple, semi-simple
and bi-simple implication agendas o¤er some clues to understand Theorem 2, more
precisely to understand the necessity of (b) and of the LHS of (a). General implication
agendas X go in three ways beyond simple ones: (i) implications p ! q 2 X may
have non-atomic antecedent p; (ii) implications p ! q 2 X may have non-atomic
consequent q; (iii) X may contain bi-implications p$ q.
Here, (i) reminds of semi-simple agendas. And indeed, the LHS of (a), for which
(i) is responsible, is closely related to our earlier characterisation (7) of consistent
quota rules for semi-simple agendas. To see why, suppose rst that in (a) p ! q
has atomic consequent q. Then the LHS of (a) coincides with the inequality in (7).
Now suppose q is non-atomic. Then p ! q is logically equivalent to the conjunction
^b2C(q)nC(p)p! b, and the LHS of (a) is equivalent to applying the inequality in (7)
to all implications p! b; b 2 C(q)nC(p).
Further, (iii) reminds of bi-simple agendas. Part (b), for which (iii) is responsible,
is indeed closely related to our characterisation (9) of consistent quota rules for bi-
simple agendas. If in (b) both p and q are atomic, (b) is equivalent to the condition
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in (9). If p and/or q is non-atomic, (b) is the right generalisation of (9), as formally
shown in the appendix.
Finally, (ii) is the aspect in which general implication agendas go substantially
beyond both semi- and bi-simple ones. It is responsible for the (complex) RHS in-
equalities in (a). These inequalities are needed because (ii) introduces new types of
inconsistency like fa! b; a! c;:(a! (b ^ c))g.
7 An abstract characterisation result
A central issue so far was that each agenda X has its own types/sources of inconsist-
ency Y  X (e.g. the sets fa; a ! b;:bg  X if X is a simple implication agenda).
What exactly are types/sourcesof inconsistency? They are irreducible sets Y  X,
as made precise now. I introduce an abstract simplicity relation between inconsistent
sets Y  X, which allows one to simplify inconsistent sets, which yields irreducible
sets. I do this in full generality, i.e. independently of implication agendas and the
particular logic C+. This gives rise to an abstract characterisation result of which
all above characterisations are applications. The notion of irreducible sets generalises
a special irreducibility notion introduced by Dietrich and List [8]; it also generalises
minimal inconsistent sets (which are based on set-inclusion rather than a general sim-
plicity relation), and for this reason the abstract characterisation result generalises
the characterisation by the intersection propertyin Nehring and Puppe [18, 19].
To avoid unnecessary restrictions to special judgment aggregation problems, we
adopt Dietrichs [3] general logics framework in this section: let X  L be an ar-
bitrary agenda of propositions from any formal language L with well-behaved logical
interconnections.22 Further, let I be the set of all inconsistent sets Y  X.
Given the intended purpose, I will dene irreducibility in such a way that
every inconsistent and complete set A  X has an irreducible subset. (16)
This property ensures that collective consistency holds if and only if no irreducible
set is ever collectively accepted. Property (16) is the analogue of the property (10)
underlying the 2-step procedure in earlier sections. Of course, we could achieve (16)
by simply dening irreducible as minimal inconsistent, since any inconsistent
set A  X has a minimal inconsistent subset. But this would often create a large
number of irreducible sets (hence many redundant inequalities in step 2). The ir-
reducibility notion I introduce depends on a parameter: the simplicity notion used.
Under a certain (extreme) simplicity notion, irreduciblewill coincide with minimal
inconsistent; other simplicity notions lead to fewer irreducible sets.
I now dene simplicity (from which I later dene irreducibility). Suppose we have
a notion of simplicity of sets in I given by a binary relation < on I, where Z < Y 
22The well-behavedness can be expressed either in terms of the entailment notion  (conditions L1-
L3 in Dietrich [3]) or in terms of the inconsistency notion (conditions I1-I3 in Dietrich [3]) (assuming
that both notions are interdenable; see Section 2). Stated in terms of the consistency notion,
the three conditions are: (I1) sets fp;:pg  L are inconsistent; (I2) subsets of consistent sets are
consistent; (I3) the empty set ; is consistent, and each consistent set A  L has a consistent superset
B  L containing a member of each pair p;:p 2 L. If the agenda X is innite, I also assume the
logic to be compact: every inconsistent set A  L has a nite inconsistent subset. All this holds for
C+ and most familiar logics, including propositional and predicate logics, classical and non-classical
logics, with the important exception of non-monotonic logics.
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is interpreted as Z is simper than Y . There is much freedom in how to specify <
(the goal being to obtain nice irreducible sets, as explained later). For instance,
we might dene < by Z < Y :, jZj < jY j (i.e. simplermeans smaller), or by
Z < Y :, Z (nite Y (i.e. simplermeans to be a proper nite subset). I place
only two restrictions on the simplicity notion:
Proper subsets are simpler: for all Y; Z 2 I, if Z (nite Y then Z < Y .23
No innite simplication chains: < is well-founded, i.e. there is no innite
sequence (Yk)k=1;2;::: in I such that Yk+1 < Yk for all k = 1; 2; :::24
A simplicity relation is a binary relation< on I with these properties. For instance
the two relations < just mentioned are simplicity relations.
Suppose we have chosen a simplicity relation <. Then (16) holds for the following
reason. Starting from an arbitrary complete set A 2 I, one can nd a nite sequence
of simplications A = Y1 > Y2 > ::: such that the simplied sets Y1; Y2; ::: all remain
subsets of A and the sequence terminates with an irreducible set (as dened below).
An example is helpful. Suppose A = Y1 is innite. Then in a rst simplication
step we can move to a nite inconsistent subset Y2  A (which exists since the
logic is compact or X is nite; see footnote 22). To bring the example into familiar
terrain, assume that the agenda is an implication agenda and that Y2 = fa; a !
(b1 ^ :::^ b5); b6; (b1 ^ ::::^ b6)$ c;:cg. In the next simplication step, there are two
cases.
Case 1: If all of b1; :::; b5 are in A, the inconsistent set Y3 := fb1; :::; b6; (b1^::::^b6)$
c;:cg is a subset of A.
Case 2: If not all of b1; :::; b5 are in A, say bj =2 A, then :bj 2 A (as A is complete),
and so the inconsistent set Y 03 := fa; a! (b1 ^ ::: ^ b5);:bjg is a subset of A.
Of course, the new subset of A (Y3 or Y 03) is not under all simplicity notions <
simpler than Y2: for instance, we have Y3 6< Y2 if < is the smaller thanrelation (i.e.
Z < Y , jZj < jY j). There is however an obvious simplicity notion for which both Y3
and Y 03 are simpler than Y2: they contain fewer connection rules than Y2 (namely one
instead of two). Indeed the application to implication agendas (in the appendix) will
use a simplicity relation < that lexicographically prioritises minimising the number of
(possibly negated) connection rules over minimising the number of (possibly negated)
atomic propositions, thereby ensuring that Y3 < Y2 and Y 03 < Y2.
The set Y3 is obtained from Y2 in a particular manner: I have taken in new
propositions (namely b1; :::; b5) each of which is logically entailed by some set of old
propositions, namely by V = fa; a ! (b1 ^ ::: ^ b5)g  Y2. The fact that each
newproposition bj is entailed by a V  Y2 has the important consequence that a
simplication of Y2 into a subset of A is possible whether or not A contains all new
propositions: if A does then Y3  A, and if A does not contain the newproposition
23Z (nite Y stands for Z ( Y&jZj < 1. (nite can be replaced throughout by ( if one
assumes a nite agenda.
24< need not be connected, nor even transitive (if < also satises these conditions, < is a well-
order). Note that well-foundedness implies asymmetry (i.e. if Z < Y then Y  Z), hence irreexivity.
Further, given asymmetry and transitivity, < is well-founded if and only if every set ; 6= J  I on
which < is connected has a least element (i.e. a Z 2 J with Z < Y for all Y 2 J nfZg).
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bj then V [ f:bjg = Y 03  A. In the latter case, what is it that allows us to simplify
Y2 into V [ f:bjg? First, the entailment V  bj guarantees us that V [ f:bjg is
indeed an inconsistent set, i.e. is in the range I of the simplicity relation. But this
alone does not su¢ ce: V [ f:bjg must actually be simpler than Y2. In summary,
the following properties of the set Y3 ensure that Y2 can be simplied (into Y3 or
another set): Y3 is simpler than Y2, and moreover each newproposition p 2 Y3nY2
is entailed by a set of oldpropositions V  Y2 such that V [ f:pg is simpler than
Y2. In this case I call Y3 a reduction of Y2, as formally dened now.25
Denition 1 Given a simplicity relation <,
(i) Z 2 I is a (<-)reduction of Y 2 I (and Y is (<-)reducible to Z) if Z < Y and
moreover each p 2 ZnY is entailed by some V  Y satisfying V [ f:pg < Y ;
(ii) Y 2 I is (<-)irreducible if it has no reduction; let IR< := fY 2 I : Y is
<-irreducibleg (the set of of minimal elements of the reduction relation).
The art is to use a simplicity relation < that allows su¢ ciently many (and the
right) simplications so as to give few and elegant irreducible sets (hence a simple
characterisation of collective consistency). Let me take up the two example above.
Example 1 (being simpler as being a subset). Let < be (nite. Then reduction
coincides with simplication: Z 2 I is a reduction of Y 2 I if and only if Z (nite Y .
So Y is irreducible if and only if Y is a minimal inconsistent set, i.e. IR< = MI
where
MI := fY 2 I : no proper subset of Y is in Ig.
It can be shown that if X is a simple implication agenda then the set IR< =MI
consists of all sets Y  X of type Y = fp;:pg or type
Y = fa1; a1 ! a2; :::; ak 1 ! ak;:akg (a1; :::; ak pairwise distinct, k  2). (17)
Example 2 (being simpler as being smaller). Let Z < Y :, jZj < jY j. Then
reduction is equivalent to Dietrich and Lists [8] special reduction notion (see footnote
25). If X is again a simple implication agenda, IR< is now much smaller than in
Example 1: IR< can be shown to consist of all sets Y  X of type fp;:pg, or of
type (17) with k = 2 (i.e. of type fa; a ! b;:bg, like in Lemma 1). To see why
sets of type (17) are not irreducible if k > 2, note that such a set Y is reducible for
instance to Z := fak 1; ak 1 ! ak;:akg, because jZj < jY j and ak 1 is entailed by
V := fa1; a1 ! a2; :::; ak 2 ! ak 1g where jV [f:ak 1gj < jY j. As a di¤erent agenda,
consider a standard strict preference aggregation problem with a set of optionsK 6= ;.
This can be represented by the agenda XK := fxPy;:xPy : x; y 2 Kg in a suitable
predicate logic with a binary predicate P for strict preference, a set of constants
K for options, and a set of axioms containing the rationality conditions on strict
linear orders, including for instance the transitivity axiom (8v1)(8v2)(8v3)((v1Pv2 ^
v2Pv3) ! v1Pv3) (see Dietrich and List [7]; also List and Pettit [16]). Dietrich and
List [8] call a set Y  XK a k-cycle(k  1) if it has the form
Y = fx1Px2; x2Px3; :::; xk 1Pxk; xkPx1g (x1; :::; xk 2 K pairwise distinct), (18)
25 In the special case that < is dened by Y < Z :, jY j < jZj, this denition of reduction (and
irreducibility) becomes equivalent to that introduced for di¤erent purposes by Dietrich and List [8].
Proposition 1 generalises one of their results. The present notion of reduction is more exible and
general, as sets may be simplied in other ways than through decreasing their size.
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or arises from such a set by replacing one or more of the members xPy by the
logically equivalent proposition :yPx. They show that the irreducible sets are the
k-cycles with k  3. To see why for k > 3 a k-cycle is not irreducible (though
minimal inconsistent), note that a set Y of type (18) with k  4 is reducible to
Z := fx1Px2; x2Px3; x3Px1g (a 3-cycle), because jZj < jY j and x3Px1 is entailed by
V := fx3Px4; x4Px5; :::; xkPx1g where jV [ f:x3Px1gj < jY j.
To understand the properties of reduction better, let me record two lemmas.
Lemma 3 Given any simplicity relation <, the reduction relation is itself a simplicity
relation, that is:
(i) for all Y; Z 2 I, if Z (nite Y then Z is a reduction of Y ;
(ii) there is no innite sequence (Yk)k=1;2;::: in I such that Yk+1 is a reduction of
Yk for all k = 1; 2; :::
Proof. Both parts follow immediately from the analogous properties of <. 
Lemma 4 (i) For any simplicity relation <, IR< MI, and if < = (nite then
IR< =MI.
(ii) For any simplicity relations < and <0, if < is a subrelation of <0 then IR<0 
IR<.
Proof. (i) Let < be a simplicity relation. For all Y 2 I, if Y =2 MI< then Y has
an inconsistent proper subset Z, which we can choose nite by compactness of the
logic. By Lemma 3 Y is reducible to Z, whence Y =2 IR<.
(ii) If < and <0 are simplicity relations and < is a subrelation of <0, then <-
reduction is a subrelation of <0-reduction, and so IR<0  IR<. 
Lemma 4 gives a general idea on how the set of irreducible sets IR< depends
on the simplicity notion < used. The ner < is, i.e. the more simplications are
allowed, the more reductions are allowed, and so the smaller IR< is (see part (ii)).
The coarsest choice of < is (nite; then the only reductions are those to nite proper
subsets, and IR< is maximal: IR< =MI, whereas in general IR< MI (see part
(i)).
I now prove the central property (16) announced earlier: every inconsistent and
complete judgment set A  X has an irreducible subset (reachable from A via nitely
many simplications).26
Proposition 1 Given any simplicity relation <, every inconsistent and complete set
A  X has a subset in IR<.
So, by Example 2 above, if X is a simple implication agenda then any inconsistent
and complete set A  X has a subset of type fp;:pg or fa; a! b;:bg (as also shown
in Lemma 1); and if X is instead the preference agenda XK , A has a subset that is a
k-cycle with k  3 a well-known result of social choice theory since A corresponds
to a connected strict preference relation  on K with rationality violation.
26The condition proper subsets are simpler on the simplicity relation < may be dropped in
Proposition 1 but not in Theorem 3.
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Proof. Let < and A be as specied. Assume for a contradiction that A has no
subset in IR<. I recursively dene a sequence (Yk)k=1;2;::: of inconsistent subsets of
A such that Yk+1 < Yk for all k. This contradicts the well-foundedness of <.
First, put Y1 := A, which is indeed an inconsistent subset of A.
Second, suppose Yk is already dened. By assumption, Yk is reducible, say to
Z 2 I. First assume Z  Yk. Letting Yk+1 := Z, it is true that Yk+1 is a subset of A
(as Yk+1  Yk  A) and that Yk+1 < Yk (as Yk+1 is a reduction of Yk). Now suppose
Z * A. Then there is a p 2 ZnA. As Z is a reduction of Yk, there is a V  Yk that
entails p with V [ f:pg < Yk. Letting Yk+1 := V [ f:pg, we have Yk+1 < Yk, and
Yk+1  A because V  Yk  A and because :p 2 A since p =2 A and A is complete.

By Proposition 1, a quota rule F(mp)p2X+ is consistent if and only if it never
accepts any Y 2 IR<. The following lemma tells which inequality we must impose
to achieve this.
Lemma 5 For every minimal inconsistent (hence every irreducible) set Y  X, a
quota rule F(mp)p2X+ never accepts all p 2 Y if and only if
X
p2Y (n   mp) < n
(where m:p := n mp + 1 for all p 2 X+).
Proof. Consider a minimal inconsistent Y  X and a quota rule F := F(mp)p2X+ .
First assume
P
p2Y (n   mp)  n. Then N can be partitioned into (possibly
empty) subgroups Np; p 2 Y , of size jNpj  n mp. Construct a prole (A1; :::; An)
of complete and consistent judgment sets such that, for all p 2 Y , the people in Np
reject just p out of Y , i.e. Ai  Y nfpg for all i 2 Np; such Ais exist as Y nfpg is
consistent. Then Y  F (A1; :::; An) (as desired) since the number of people accepting
a p 2 Y is n  jNpj  n  (n mp) = mp.
Conversely, suppose that F has an outcome F (A1; :::; An)  Y . I show thatP
p2Y (n  mp)  n. For all p 2 Y , put np := jfi : p 2 Aigj; hence jfi : p =2 Aigj =
n  np. So
jf(p; i) 2 Y N : p =2 Aigj =
X
p2Y
(n  np).
As no Ai contains all p 2 Y , jf(p; i) 2 Y N : p =2 Aigj  n, i.e.
P
p2Y (n  np)  n.
So, as for all p 2 Y we have np  mp (by p 2 F (A1; :::; An)),
P
p2Y (n mp)  n. 
Proposition 1 and Lemma 5 imply the desired characterisation result.
Theorem 3 For any simplicity relation <, a quota rule F(mp)p2X+ is consistent if
and only ifX
p2Y
(n mp) < n for all Y 2 IR< (where m:p := n mp + 1 8p 2 X+).
Theorem 3 generalises the anonymous case of the intersection property result
in Nehring and Puppe [18, 19]. This result makes no reference to a simplicity relation
and usesMI instead of IR<. Hence it follows from Theorem 3 by choosing < such
that IR< = MI, i.e. by choosing < as the coarsest simplicity relation (nite. A
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non-anonymous variant of Theorem 3 can be derived similarly, generalising the non-
anonymous intersection property result.27 One might wonder whether one could also
generalise the (anonymous or non-anonymous) intersection property result in Dietrich
and List [6] which requires no collective completeness28, again by using irreducible
sets instead of minimal inconsistent sets. No straightforward generalisation works,
since the completeness assumption is essential in Proposition 1.
In general, the ner the simplicity relation < is chosen, the smaller IR< becomes,
and hence the slimmerTheorem 3s characterisation becomes since redundant in-
equalities are avoided. The question of how much smaller thanMI the set IR< can
get (and hence how much slimmerthan the intersection property result Theorem
3s characterisation can get) depends on the concrete agenda X. In Example 2 above,
IR< gets signicantly smaller than MI. Note nally that if the inequalities have
no solution, the agenda has no consistent quota rule. This is often so for agendas
in classical logic, since here the judgments on atomic propositions fully settle the
judgments on compound propositions.
While theoretically elegant, Theorem 3s system of inequalities is abstract. Check-
ing whether it holds requires to know which sets are irreducible. The latter question
can even be non-decidable in the technical sense: in some logics (such as standard
predicate logic), it is non-decidable whether a set of propositions is inconsistent; so
derived notions like irreducibility or minimal inconsistency may also be non-decidable.
In view of applications, two corollaries are useful. Call an inconsistent set trivial
if it contains a pair p;:p or contains a contradiction p (like a ^ :a). Any trivial
Y 2 IR< has by minimal inconsistency the form Y = fp;:pg or Y = fpg. So for
trivial Y 2 IR< the inequality
X
p2Y (n  mp) < n holds automatically, whatever
the thresholds (mp)p2X+ 2 f1; :::; ngX+ . Removing these redundant inequalities, we
obtain a slightly slimmer characterisation:
Corollary 4 Theorem 3 still holds if IR< is replaced by IR< := fY 2 IR< : Y is
non-trivialg:
As an illustration, consider a simple implication agenda X. By Theorem 1,
F(mp)p2X+ is consistent if and only if
mb  ma +ma!b   n for all a! b 2 X. (19)
This characterisation is equivalent to that of Corollary 4 if < is dened by Z < Y :,
jZj < jY j: indeed, IR< = ffa; a! b;:bg : a! b 2 Xg by Example 2 above, so that
27 If we endow each p 2 X+ not with a threshold mp 2 f1; :::; ng but, more generally, with a set Cp
of (winning) coalitions C  N such that ; =2 Cp, N 2 Cp, and [C 2 Cp&C  C  N ] ) C 2 Cp,
we can dene an aggregation rule F(Cp)p2X+ with universal domain by F(Cp)p2X+ (A1; :::; An) = fp 2
X : fi 2 N : p 2 Aig 2 Cpg (where C:p := fC  N : NnC =2 Cpg for all p 2 X+). Such a
rule F(Cp)p2X+ is called a committee rule. The quota rules F(mp)p2X+ are precisely the anonymous
committee rules (where each p 2 X+ has set of winning coalitions Cp = fC  N : jCj  mpg). The
analogue of Theorem 3 is: for any simplicty relation <, a committee rule F(Cp)p2X+ is consistent if
and only if \p2Y Cp 6= ; for all Y 2 IR< and all winning coalitions Cp 2 Cp, p 2 Y . This becomes
the non-anonymous intersection property result if IR< =MI, i.e. if we choose < := nite.
28More precisely, it does not require for propositions p 2 X that m:p = n  mp + 1 (or, in the
non-anonymous case discussed in footnote 27, that the coalitions winning for :p be the coalitions
whose complements are not winning for p).
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the inequalities
X
p2Y (n   mp) < n; Y 2 IR

<, are equivalent to the inequalities
(19). If < is alternatively dened as (nite, then by Example 1 above IR< consists of
all sets of type (17); thus IR< is now much larger, and the resulting characterisation
of Corollary 4 contains redundant inequalities.
Determining the set IR< (or IR<) is often hard, e.g. for general implication
agendas. Determining a superset of it can be simpler and it su¢ ces by the next
corollary, obtained by combining Corollary 4 with Theorem 3, the latter applied with
< = (nite, i.e. with IR< =MI.
Corollary 5 Theorem 3 still holds if IR< is replaced by any Y with IR<  Y 
MI.
So, to nd out for a concrete agenda which quota rules are consistent, it su¢ ces
to dene a suitable simplicity relation < and determine some set Y with IR<  Y 
MI. Precisely this is done for implication agendas in the appendix.
8 Conclusion
Connection rules, of the uni-directional kind p! q or bi-directional kind p$ q, are
at the heart of judgment aggregation. They express links that may be accepted or
rejected, for instance causal links between facts or justicational links between claims.
Once we interpret these (bi-)implications subjunctively, we can generate consistent
and complete collective judgment sets by taking independent and anonymous votes
on the propositions, provided that we use appropriate acceptance thresholds (see
Theorems 1 and 2 and Table 2). This possibility result holds for judgment aggregation
problems on so-called implication agendas.
The results on implication agendas are applications of an abstract result, Theorem
3, which applies to arbitrary agendas in a general logic: it characterises consistent
aggregation in terms of so-called irreducible sets (which generalise minimal incon-
sistent sets29). It would be interesting to apply this result to classes of agendas
other than implication agendas, in order to gain new insights on (im)possibilities
of propositionwise voting. However, at least as important as this would be to de-
velop a systematic understanding of non-propositionwise judgment aggregation rules.
Though often mentioned, this route is largely unexplored.
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A Proof of Theorem 2 from Theorem 3
We consider an arbitrary implication agenda X ( L). The language L (dened in
Section 2) is endowed with the non-classical notions of entailment and (in)consistency
dened in Section 3 (using C+-interpretations). Recall that A ( L) is the set of
atomic propositions. Denote the set of all connection rules by R (= fa ! b; (a ^
b) $ c; :::g). For all S  L let S: := f:p : p 2 Sg and S := S [ S:. We wish
to apply Theorem 3 to X but with which simplicity relation <? Dening < as
(nite gives a very complicated set IR< = MI (containing for instance sets like
Y = fa; a ! b; a0; a0 ! b0; (b ^ b0) ! (a ^ c);:cg). Even the ner simplicity relation
given by Z < Y :, jZj < jY j, while suitable for simple implication agendas (see
the end of Section 7), is inappropriate in general since, as indicated in Section 7,
we would like to simplify sets like fa; a ! (b1 ^ b2 ^ b3); (b1 ^ b2 ^ b3) ! c;:cg into
fb1; b2; b3; (b1 ^ b2 ^ b3) ! c;:cg on the grounds that the latter set contains fewer
connection rules despite of having more elements overall. The following lexicographic
simplicity notion allows us to perform such simplications and to get a grip on IR<.
For all inconsistent sets Z; Y  X,
Z < Y :, (jZ \ Rj; jZ \ Aj) is lexicographically smaller than (jY \ Rj; jY \ Aj),
i.e. jZ \ Rj < jY \ Rj or jZ \ Rj = jY \ Rj&jZ \ Aj < jZ \ Aj. For instance,
fa;:bg < fa! bg as (0; 2) is lexicographically smaller than (1; 0).
The following is easily shown (using that the lexicographically smaller than
relation is well-founded).
Lemma 6 The above relation < is a simplicity relation.30
To identify the <-irreducible sets, we rst need to understand better which en-
tailments and inconsistencies hold within implication agendas; hence the next two
technical lemmas. Generalising Section 6s notation Xp, I put, for all p 2 L and all
R  L,
Rp := fs 2 L : p! s 2 R or p$ s 2 R or s$ p 2 Rg,
the set of propositions reachablefrom p via (bi-)implications in R. I rst establish
a plausible fact about entailments between connection rules: namely, for instance,
that R = fp! b; p! (c^ d)g  p! (b^ c) because each conjunct of b^ c (i.e. b and
c) is a conjunct of some s 2 Rp = fb; c ^ dg.
Lemma 7 For all R  R and p! q 2 R,
R  p! q , C(q)nC(p) 
[
s2Rp
C(s).
Note that this characterisation of R  p! q implies one of R  p$ q (for R  R
and p$ q 2 R), since R  p$ q if and only if R  p! q and R  q ! p.
Proof. Let R  R and p! q 2 R.
30More generally, for any partition of X into sets X1; :::; Xk, a simplicity relation < is dened by
Z < Y :, [(jZ \X1j; :::; jZ \Xnj) is lexicographically smaller than (jY \X1j; :::; jY \Xnj)].
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1. First let C(q)nC(p) 
[
s2Rp
C(s). Suppose all r 2 R hold in world w of
interpretation (W; (fr); (vw)). We have to show that p ! q holds in w, i.e. that all
a 2 C(q) hold in all w 2 fp(w). Let a 2 C(q) and w 2 fp(w). By assumption,
a 2 C(p) or a 2 C(s) for some s 2 Rp. In the rst case, a holds in w as p does (by
w 2 fp(w)). In the second case, a holds in w as s does (by vw(p ! s) = T and
w 2 fp(w)).
2. Conversely, suppose that a 2 C(q)nC(p) but a =2
[
s2Rp
C(s). To show
R 2 p ! q, consider an interpretation (W; (fp); (vw)) such that: (i) W contains
at least two distinct worlds w;w; (ii) all atomic propositions hold in w, (iii) all
atomic propositions except a hold in w, (iv) fp(w) = fw;wg (which is allowed as p
holds in w and w), and (v) for all t 2 Lnfpg ft(w)  fwg. To complete the proof,
I show that all r 2 R hold in w but p ! q doesnt. First, vw(p ! q) = F by (iv)
and as vw(q) = F by (iii). To show the truth in w of all r 2 R, I show that of every
implication t ! s with t ! s 2 R or t $ s 2 R or s $ t 2 R. For such t ! s, if
t 6= p then vw(t ! s) = T by (v) and (ii); and if t = p then vw(t ! s) = T by (iv)
and (ii)-(iii) and using that a =2 C(s). 
The next technical lemma shows that there are broadly two ways in which a subset
A of the implication agenda X can be inconsistent (the second way, (20), holds for
instance if :(a! (b ^ c)); a! b; a! c 2 A.).
Lemma 8 If A  A[ R is inconsistent, then either already AnR: is inconsistent or
A contains some :r 2 R: such that A \R  r. (20)
Proof. Suppose A  A[ R. Assume A := AnR: is consistent and (20) does not
hold. I show that A is consistent. For all :(p! q) 2 A,
() there is ap!q 2 C(q)nC(p) with ap!q =2 C(q0) for all q0 2 Ap,
as otherwise C(q)nC(p)  [q02ApC(q0), whence by Lemma 7 A \R  p! q (take
R := A \ R and note that Rp = Ap), implying (20). Further, for all :(p $ q) 2 A,
either
(1) there is a1p$q 2 C(q)nC(p) with a1p$q =2 C(q0) for all q0 2 Ap
or
(2) there is a2p$q 2 C(p)nC(q) with a2p$q =2 C(p0) for all p0 2 Aq,
as otherwise C(q)nC(p)  [q02ApC(q0) and C(p)jC(q)  [p02Aq , whence again by
Lemma 7 A \R  p! q and A \R  p! r, i.e. A \R  p$ q, implying (20).
To prove As consistency, I construct an interpretation and show that in a world
all r 2 A hold. Notationally, for any r 2 R let rmat be rs material counterpart:
(p ! q)mat is :p _ q, and (p $ q)mat is (p ! q)mat ^ (q ! p)mat. Let Amat be the
set arising from A by replacing all r 2 A \ R by rmat. Since A is consistent and
r j= rmat for all r 2 R, Amat is also consistent. So there exists an interpretation
(W; (fp); (vw)) and a world w such that
(w1) all members of Amat are true in w.
As the propositions in Amat contain no subjunctive (bi-)implications, their truth
values in w depend neither on other worlds nor on the functions fp; p 2 L. So we
may assume the following w.l.o.g.
(w2) For all :(p ! q) 2 A, there is a world wp!q 2 Wnfwg in which all atomic
proposition except ap!q hold; and wp!q 2 fp(w) but wp$q =2 fs(w) 8s 2 Lnfpg.
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(w3) For all :(p $ q) 2 A with (1), there is a world w1p$q 2 Wnfwg in which
all atomic propositions except a1p$q hold; and w1p$q 2 fp(w) but w1p$q =2 fs(w)
8s 2 Lnfpg.
(w4) For all :(p $ q) 2 A with (2), there is a world w2p$q 2 Wnfwg in which
all atomic propositions except a2p$q hold; and w2p$q 2 fq(w) but w2p$q =2 fs(w)
8s 2 Lnfqg.
(w5) Worlds w0 2W other than those dened in (w1)-(w4) are not reachable from
w: w0 =2 fr(w) 8r 2 L.
To complete the proof, I consider any r 2 A and show that r holds in w.
Case 1 : r is atomic or negated atomic. Then r 2 Amat . So r holds in w by (w1).
Case 2 : r is an implication s! t. Let w0 2 fs(w). I have to show that t holds in
w0. If w0 = w, s holds in w by w 2 fs(w); so, as (s ! t)mat = :s _ t holds in w by
(w1), t holds in w. Now let w0 6= w. Then by (w5), w0 is one of the worlds dened in
(w2)-(w4). Assume w0 = wp!q, a world dened in (w2) (proofs for (w3) and (w4) are
similar). By wp!q 2 fs(w) and (w2), p = s. By (w2), all atomic propositions except
ap!q hold in wp!q, where ap!q isnt a conjunct of t by (). So t holds in wp!q = w0.
Case 3 : r is a bi-implication s$ t. s$ t holds in w if s! t and t! s are true
in w. The latter can be shown by a procedure analogous to that in case 2.
Case 4 : r is a negated implication :(p ! q). To show that r holds in w, I show
that p ! q fails in w. This is so because, by (w2), wp!q 2 fp(w) where q fails in
wp!q as its conjunct ap!q fails.
Case 5 : r is a negated bi-implication :(p $ q). To show that r holds in w, I
show that p $ q is false in w, i.e. that p ! q or q ! p is false in w. Under (1)
p! q is false in w (consider the world w1p$q and use (w3)), and under (2) q ! p is
false in w (consider the world w2p$q and use (w4)). 
To allow us to apply Corollary 5, I now dene a class Y of inconsistent sets Y  X,
and I show that IR<  Y MI. Let Y := Y! [Y$ [Y:! [Y:$, where Y!, Y$,
Y:! and Y:$ are the sets that consist, respectively, of
 all Y  X of type fp! q;:ag [ C(p) where a 2 C(q)nC(p);
 all Y  X of type fp$ q;:ag[C(p) or fq $ p;:ag[C(p) where a 2 C(q)nC(p);
 all Y  X of type f:(p ! q)g [ fps : s 2 Sg where S 2 Xp!q and 8s 2 S
ps 2 fp! s; p$ s; s$ pg;
 all Y  X of type f:(p $ q)g [ fps : s 2 Sg [ fqs : s 2 S0g where S 2 Xp!q,
8s 2 S ps 2 fp ! s; p $ s; s $ pg, S0 2 Xq!p, 8s 2 S0 qs 2 fq ! s; q $
s; s $ qg, and the sets fps : s 2 Sg, fqs : s 2 S0g are either each disjoint
with fp $ q; q $ pg or each equal to fq $ pg (the latter is only possible if
S = fqg&S0 = fpg; the former holds automatically if S 6= fqg&S0 6= fpg as
then q =2 S&p =2 S0).
(The set Xp!q in the last two bullet points was dened in Section 6.)
Lemma 9 For Y as dened above, Y MI.
Proof. Let Y be as specied. Consider any Y 2 Y. I show that Y 2MI by going
through the four possible cases.
1. Let Y 2 Y!, i.e. Y = fp ! q;:ag [ C(p) where a 2 C(q)nC(p). Y is
inconsistent because, by C(p)  p and fp ! q; pg  q, we have fp ! qg [ C(p)  q.
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Moreover, for any y 2 Y , the consistency of Y nfyg can be checked by nding an
interpretation with a world w in which all z 2 Y nfyg hold. Specically, fp! qg[C(p)
is consistent: let all atomic propositions hold in w and in all other worlds; f:ag[C(p)
is consistent: let all atomic propositions except a hold in w; and, for any y 2 C(p),
fp ! q;:ag [ C(p)nfyg is consistent: let the only atomic propositions true in w be
those in C(p)nfyg, and put fp(w) = ; (which is allowed as p fails in w).
2. If Y 2 Y$ then Y 2MI by a proof similar to that under 1.
3. Now let Y 2 Y:!, say (in the earlier notation) Y = f:(p! q)g[ fps : s 2 Sg.
We have fps : s 2 Sgp = S 2 Xp!q, whence by Lemma 7 fps : s 2 Sg  p ! q.
So Y is inconsistent. To check minimal inconsistency, consider any Z ( Y . If
:(p ! q) =2 Z, Z is consistent, as seen from an interpretation such that all atomic
propositions hold in all worlds. If :(p ! q) 2 Z, then Z = f:p ! q)g [ R with
R = fps : s 2 Sg and S ( S. Note that Rp = S. So Rp ( S. This and
S 2 Xp!q imply that C(q)nC(p) * [s2RpC(s)g, whence by Lemma 7 R 2 p! q. So
Z (= f:p! q)g [R) is consistent.
4. Finally, let Y 2 Y:$, say (in the earlier notation) Y = f:(p $ q)g [ fps :
s 2 Sg [ fqs : s 2 S0g. It can be shown like under 3 that fps : s 2 Sg  p ! q and
fqs : s 2 S0g  q ! p. So fps : s 2 Sg[fqs : s 2 S0g  p$ q. Hence Y is inconsistent.
Now consider any Z ( Y . If :(p$ q) =2 Z, Y is consistent by an argument like in case
3. If :(p$ q) 2 Z, then Z = f:(p$ q)g[R with R = fps : s 2 Sg[fqs : s 2 S0g
and S  S, S0  S0, where S ( S or S0 ( S0. Note that Rp = S and Rq = S0.
So Rp ( S or Rq ( S0. Hence R 2 p ! q or R 2 q ! p, by an argument like that
under 3. So R 2 p$ q. Hence Z (= f:(p$ q)g [R) is consistent. 
Lemma 10 For < and Y as dened above, IR<  Y.
Proof. Let < and Y (= Y! [ Y$ [ Y:! [ Y:$) be as specied. Consider a
Y 2 IR<. I show that Y 2 Y. I will use that Y 2MI by Lemma 4, and that (*) Y
contains no pair t;:t by non-triviality.
Case 1 : Y \ R: = ;. Then (i) Y has a subset of type fp ! qg [ C(p), or (ii)
Y has a subset of type fp $ qg [ C(p) or fq $ pg [ C(p). Otherwise Y would
be consistent, as seen from an interpretation with a world w in which the only true
atomic propositions are those in Y and such that ft(w) = ; if t 2 L is false in w: in
w, all y 2 Y \ A hold by construction (and by (*)), all p! q 2 Y hold by fp(w) = ;
(as p is false by not-(i)), all p $ q 2 Y hold by fp(w) = fq(w) = ; (as p and q are
false by not-(ii)), and there are no y 2 Y \R:.
Subcase 1a: (i) holds, say fp ! qg [ C(p)  Y . I show that Y 2 Y!. If
there is an a 2 C(q)nC(p) with :a 2 Y , then fp ! q;:ag [ C(p)  Y , hence
fp ! q;:ag [ C(p) = Y (as Y 2 MI), and so Y 2 Y!. Hence it su¢ ces to prove
that such an a exists. For a contradiction, suppose (**) :a =2 Y for all a 2 C(q)nC(p).
I show that Y is reducible to Z := Y [ C(q)nfp ! qg, a contradiction. First, Z is
indeed inconsistent: otherwise there would exist an interpretation with a world w in
which all z 2 Z hold, where by Z\R: = ; we may assume w.l.o.g. that fp(w) contains
no world other than w; thus p! q also holds in w, so that Z [ fp! qg = Y [ C(q)
is consistent, a contradiction. Second, we have Z < Y by jZ \ Rj = jY \ Rj  1 (and
by our lexicographic denition of <). Finally, any y 2 ZnY belongs to C(q), hence is
entailed by Z := C(p) [ fp ! qg ( Y ); it remains to show Z [ f:yg < Y , which I
do by proving that j(Z [ f:ygj \ Rj < jY \ Rj, i.e. that jY \ Rj > 1. Suppose the
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contrary. Then Y = fp ! qg [ C(p) [ Y 0 for some Y 0  A. By Y 2 MI, C(p) [ Y 0
is consistent. So there is an interpretation with a world w in which all a 2 C(p) [ Y 0
hold, where by C(p) [ Y 0  A we may assume w.l.o.g. that fp(p) contains no world
other than w, and that all a 2 A with :a =2 Y hold in w. All a 2 C(q) satisfy :a =2 Y :
if a 2 C(q)nC(p) by (**), and if a 2 C(q) \ C(p) by (*). So, in w, all a 2 C(q) and
hence q hold; so p ! q holds. But then all y 2 Y hold in w, contradicting Y s
inconsistency.
Subcase 1b: (ii) holds, say fp$ qg [C(p)  Y (the proof is analogous if p$ q is
replaced by q $ p). To show that Y 2 Y$, it su¢ ces to slightly adapt the proof in
Subcase 1a: replace !by $, and in both interpretations assume w.l.o.g. that
fq(w) (in addition to fp(w)) contains no world other than w.
Case 2 : Y \R: 6= ;. Then Y nR: ( Y , whence Y nR: is consistent by Y 2MI.
So by Lemma 8 Y contains a :r 2 R: such that Y \R  r. Let R := Y \R. As Y
is minimal inconsistent, Y = f:rg [R. I consider two subcases.
Subcase 2a: r is an implication p ! q. I show that Y 2 Y:!. As Y = f:(p !
q)g [ R 2 MI, R is minimal subject to entailing p ! q. So, by Lemma 7, R is
minimal subject to C(q)nC(p) 
[
s2Rp
C(s). This implies that Rp 2 Xp!q and
that R = fps : s 2 Rpg for some ps 2 fp ! s; p $ s; s $ pg, s 2 Rp. So Y
(= f:(p! q)g [R) is in Y:!.
Subcase 2b: r is an bi-implication p$ q. I show Y 2 Y:$. Write R = R1[R2[T
with R1 := R\fp! s; p$ s; s$ p : s 2 Lg, R2 := R\fq ! s; q $ s; s$ q : s 2 Lg
and T := Rn(Xp[Xq). As Y = f:(p$ q)g[R is minimal inconsistent, R is minimal
subject to entailing p$ q, i.e. minimal subject to entailing each of p! q and q ! p.
So, by Lemma 7 and using that Rp = R1p and Rq = R
2
q , the set R is minimal subject
to satisfying both (a) C(q)nC(p) 
[
s2R1p
C(s) and (b) C(p)nC(q) 
[
s2R2q
C(s). It
follows that R = R1 [R2 (i.e. T = ;).
First suppose q $ p 2 R1 or q $ p 2 R2. Then Y = f:(p $ q)g [ R  f:(p $
q); q $ pg, hence by minimal inconsistency Y = f:(p$ q); q $ pg. So Y 2 Y:$, as
desired.
Now suppose q $ p =2 R1 and q $ p =2 R2. As also p $ q =2 R1 and p $ q =2 R2
by (*), we have R1 \R2 = ;. This and the fact that the set Y = R1 [R2 is minimal
subject to (a)&(b) imply that R1 is minimal subject to (a) and that R2 is minimal
subject to (b). So (like in Subcase 2a) R1p 2 Xp!q with R1 = fps : s 2 Rpg for some
ps 2 fp ! s; p $ s; s $ pg, s 2 Rp, and R2q 2 Xq!p with R2 = fqs : s 2 Rqg for
some qs 2 fq ! s; q $ s; s$ qg, s 2 Rq. So Y (= f:(p! q)g [R1 [R2) is in Y:$,
as desired. 
By Lemmas 9 and 10, we can apply Corollary 5 to characterise consistent quota
rules. I nally prove that this characterisation can be simplied into that in Theorem
2.
Proof of Theorem 2. Let F(mp)p2X+ be a quota rule, and Y, Y!;Y$, Y:!, Y:$
the sets dened above. By Corollary 5 (using Lemmas 6; 9 and 10) I have to show
that (a)&(b) hold i¤ for all Y 2 Y (= Y! [ Y$ [ Y:! [ Y:$)X
y2Y
(n my) < n. (21)
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I will build up this equivalence in the following four steps.
Claim 1. The LHS inequalities in (a) hold i¤ (21) holds for all Y 2 Y!.
Claim 2. Given (b), the RHS inequalities in (a) hold i¤ (21) holds for all Y 2 Y:!.
Claim 3. (b) holds i¤ (21) holds for all Y 2 Y$.
By Claims 1-3, (a)&(b) hold i¤ (21) holds for all Y 2 Y! [ Y$ [ Y:!; which is
the case i¤ (21) holds for all Y 2 Y! [ Y$ [ Y:! [ Y:$, because of our last claim
which completes the proof.
Claim 4. If (21) holds for all Y 2 Y! [ Y$ then it holds for all Y 2 Y:$ (hence
the inequalities for Y 2 Y:$ are redundant in the system).
Proof of Claim 1. The inequalities (21) for all Y 2 Y! are given by
(n m:a) + (n mp!q) +
X
a02C(p)
(n ma0) < n 8p! q 2 X 8a 2 C(q)nC(p).
Using that n m:a = ma   1, these inequalities can be rewritten as
ma +
X
a02C(p)
(n ma0)  mp!q 8p! q 2 X 8a 2 C(q)nC(p),
which by taking the maximum over a is equivalent to the LHS inequalities in (a).
Proof of Claim 2. Suppose (b). The inequalities (21) for all Y 2 Y:! are given
by
n m:(p!q) +
X
s2S
(n mps) < n 8p! q 2 X 8S 2 Xp!q8(ps)s2S 2 (fp! s; p$ s; s$ pg \X)S .
These inequalities can (by n m:(p!q) = mp!q   1) be rewritten as
mp!q +
X
s2S
(n mps)  n 8p! q 2 X 8S 2 Xp!q8(ps)s2S 2 (fp! s; p$ s; s$ pg \X)S ,
or equivalently as
mp!q + max
(ps)s2S2(fp!s;p$s;s$pg\X)S
X
s2S
(n mps)  n 8p! q 2 X 8S 2 Xp!q. (22)
Note that
max
(ps)s2S2(fp!s;p$s;s$pg\X)S
X
s2S
(n mps) =
X
s2S
(n  min
ps2fp!s;p$s;s$pg\X
mps). (23)
For all s 2 S and all ps 2 fp$ q; q $ pg we have mps = n by (b). So, for all s 2 S,
minps2fp!s;p$s;s$pg\X mps is n if p ! s =2 X and mp!s if p ! s 2 X. Hence in
(23) the term (n   minps2fp!s;p$s;s$pg\X mps) drops out if p ! s =2 X and equals
(n mp!s) if p! s 2 X. Therefore (23) implies
max
(ps)s2S2(fp!s;p$s;s$pg\X)S
X
s2S
(n mps) =
X
s2S:p!s2X
(n mp!s).
Using this, the inequalities (22) are equivalent to
mp!q +
X
s2S:p!s2X
(n mp!s)  n 8p! q 2 X 8S 2 Xp!q,
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and hence, as desired, to
mp!q + max
S2Xp!q
X
s2S:p!s2X
(n mp!s)  n 8p! q 2 X.
Proof of Claim 3. 1. First assume (21) holds for all Y 2 Y$, and let p$ q 2 X.
1.1. Here I showmp$q = n. As p$ q is non-degenerate, there exist a 2 C(p)nC(q)
and b 2 C(q)nC(p). By assumption,
(n mp$q) + (n m:b) +
X
a02C(p)
(n ma0) < n,
(n mp$q) + (n m:a) +
X
b02C(q)
(n mb0) < n.
Rewriting this (by using that n m:s = ms   1 for all s 2 X), we obtain
mp$q  mb + 1 >
X
a02C(p)
(n ma0)  n ma, (24)
mp$q  ma + 1 >
X
b02C(q)
(n mb0)  n mb.
So
mp$q  n ma +mb and mp$q  n mb +ma. (25)
Adding both inequalities, we get 2mp$q  2n, whence mp$q = n.
1.2. Next I show that all a 2 C(p)C(q) have the same threshold. As C(p)C(q)
is the union of the non-empty sets C(p)nC(q) and C(q)n C(p), it is su¢ cient to show
that ma = mb for all a 2 C(p)nC(q) and b 2 C(q)nC(p). Consider such a; b. The
argument in 1.1 yields (25), which by mp$q = n implies ma  mb and mb  ma,
whence ma = mb.
1.3. Let m be the common threshold of all a 2 C(p)C(q). I suppose m < n
and show that jC(p)C(q)j  2. The rst inequality in (24) (where b 2 C(q)C(p))
implies
mp$q  mb + 1 >
X
a02C(p)nC(q)
(n ma0),
which after substituting mp$q = n and mb = ma0 = m gives
n m  jC(p)nC(q)j(n m), i.e. jC(p)nC(q)j  1.
It can be shown similarly that jC(q)nC(p)j  1. So jC(p)C(q)j  2.
1.4. Finally, let a00 2 C(p)\C(q). I show that ma00 = n. Let a; b be as in 1.1. The
rst inequality in (24) implies
mp$q  mb + 1 > (n ma00) + (n ma),
which by mp$q = n and ma = mb implies 1 > (n ma00), i.e. ma00 = n.
2. Conversely, assume (b). Consider any Y 2 Y$, say Y = fr;:ag [ C(p) where
r 2 fp $ q; q $ pg and a 2 C(q)nC(p), and let me show (21). Using (b) and
n m:a = ma   1, X
y2Y
(n my) = m  1 + jC(p)nC(q)j(n m),
36
wherem denotes the common threshold of all a0 2 C(p)C(q). Note that if jC(p)nC(q)j 
2 then jC(p)C(q)j  3, hence m = n. So, as desired,
X
y2Y
(n my) =

m  1 + n m < n if jC(p)nC(q)j = 1
n  1 + 0 < n if jC(p)nC(q)j  2.
Proof of Claim 4. Suppose (21) holds for all Y 2 Y![Y$. Consider any Y 2 Y:$,
say (in the earlier notation) Y = f:(p$ q)g [ fps : s 2 Sg [ fqs : s 2 S0g. To prove
the corresponding inequality,
(n m:(p$q)) +
X
s2S
(n mps) +
X
s2S0
(n mqs) < n,
I show that mps = n 8s 2 S and that mqs = n 8s 2 S0; in fact, I only show
the former as the latter holds analogously. Let s 2 S. Recall that S 2 Xp!q and
ps 2 fp! s; p$ s; s$ pg.
If ps 2 fp$ s; s$ pg then already by Claim 3 mps = n, as desired.
Now assume ps = p! s. Since s 2 S 2 Xp!q, C(q)nC(p) is a subset of [s2SC(s)
but not of [s2SnfsgC(s). So there is a b 2 C(s)\C(q)nC(p). Moreover, as p$ q is
non-degenerate, there is an a 2 C(p)n C(q). As a; b 2 C(p)C(q), we have ma = mb
by Claim 3. Using Claim 1,
mp!q 
X
a02C(p)
(n ma0) + max
b02C(q)nC(p)
mb0  n ma +mb = n,
whence mp!q = n, as desired. 
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